When Russian Railways (RZD) announced in May that it would pursue major projects in Ghana, Libya, and Burkina Faso, Moscow presented them as investments in Africa’s economic future. Rail lines to efficiently transport cocoa and gold in Ghana, connect Burkina Faso’s landlocked economy to the sea, or reconnect Libya after years of war sound like steps toward prosperity.

But these proposals are taking place in politically fragile and sanction-affected environments where Russia perceives strategic opportunities. Burkina Faso has sharply shifted toward Moscow after expelling French forces, and Libya remains divided after more than a decade of conflict. Ghana faces a different challenge; as the continent’s leading gold producer, it is under fiscal pressure and recently required an IMF bailout. By choosing these contexts, Russia indicates that its rail diplomacy is as much about politics as it is about development.

In Ghana, the plan centers on reviving the Western Corridor line, once a key artery for cocoa, gold, and oil exports. In Burkina Faso, Moscow has set its sights on modernizing the Ouagadougou–Abidjan railway, the country’s lifeline to the coast. In Libya, the priority is resurrecting a long-dormant 2008 contract for the Sirte–Benghazi line, abandoned after the 2011 uprising, with just 14 kilometers completed.

On paper, these initiatives line up with the African Union’s Agenda 2063 and the Program for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), both of which emphasize regional rail integration. They have also featured prominently in Russia–Africa Summits since 2019, where Moscow pitches transport projects as part of its broader offer to African partners.  But critics note the broader geopolitical context. Russia’s trade with Africa totaled just $24.5 billion in 2024—a fraction of China’s nearly $295 billion, suggesting that these projects may serve other purposes.

Financing, Dependency, and Geopolitics

The development case is strong. In Ghana, inadequate road networks hinder mining exports, and the revival of rail could transform trade efficiency. The African Development Bank (AfDB) estimates that closing Africa’s infrastructure gap could lift GDP growth by nearly two percentage points annually, with railways among the highest-return assets when properly implemented. Burkina Faso’s reliable access to Ivorian ports could be a game-changer for gold and cotton exports, while Libya’s reconstruction needs make rail an obvious tool for reconnecting regions and stimulating jobs.

Yet Russia’s financing methods raise red flags. Moscow often relies on opaque loan structures tied to natural resource concessions, turning infrastructure into leverage over mining rights, energy deals, or strategic assets—the type African leaders have been warned against.  “Resource-backed financing arrangements frequently favor lenders while leaving African nations financially constrained and politically compromised,” warns a World Bank analysis.

Critics see these projects as part of Russia’s broader global strategy. Andriy Yusov, spokesperson for Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence, cautioned: “Russian influence in Africa through infrastructure projects is a destabilizing factor which, under the guise of development aid, results in dependence on Moscow.”

The push to extend the North–South International Transport Corridor (INSTC) toward Africa illustrates that these projects are less about African development and more about embedding Moscow’s logistics network globally.

During a visit to Senegal, U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen warned African leaders to “be careful about tempting deals” that “can be opaque and ultimately fail to help the people they were meant to help.”

African voices also echo these concerns. Columnist Tafi Mhaka has argued that “African leaders need to acknowledge Russian expansionism is as immoral and harmful as Western colonialism,” warning that Moscow’s economic and security initiatives risk replicating patterns of neo-imperial influence on the continent.

Such models risk locking countries into dependency long after construction ends. In Burkina Faso, they could cement Russia’s role as both economic partner and security guarantor. In Libya, rail investments could become entwined with broader Mediterranean rivalries over ports, grain, and military positioning.

At a conference in Accra in March 2024, Professor Adebayor Olukoshi emphasized the urgency of breaking Africa’s cyclical debt reliance through leadership: “We must break this cycle, and the starting point is political awakening; an awakening that provides a framework in which leadership vision can then be developed.”

A Track Record To Question

Russia insists it can deliver. Sergei Pavlov, First Deputy CEO of RZD, argued recently: “Given the potential for increased trade with African countries, we see strong prospects … We’re ready to actively participate in building these corridors.”

Yet history suggests caution. The Soviet Union’s ambitious Ajaokuta Steel Plant in Nigeria was initially hailed in the 1970s as a symbol of industrial progress but never became fully operational. Post-Soviet Russian projects, such as the original Libyan railway contract, also collapsed during the 2011 uprising despite years of planning. High-profile railway announcements in Nigeria and Ethiopia generated media attention but rarely progressed beyond preliminary agreements, as Chinese competitors consistently outperformed Russian firms in financing, technical expertise, and execution. Experts remain skeptical that current African railway promises will avoid these familiar pitfalls.

Also, Russian projects rarely stand alone. In Burkina Faso, Russian-linked miner Nordgold faces scrutiny for opaque gold exports routed through Guinea and Dubai; a refurbished railway could make such flows smoother while limiting oversight.

In Ghana, rail discussions coincide with growing petroleum imports and new mineral-sector ties. In Libya, rail ambitions accompany wheat shipments, arms sales, and security deals, reflecting Russia’s “full-spectrum” strategy: combining transport, mining, and arms to secure influence. Russia already accounts for at least 21% of Africa’s arms imports, according to SIPRI, and the Wagner Group’s successor, the Africa Corps, pairs security guarantees with economic ventures. The country also faces criticism for environmental negligence compared to its Western counterparts.

Opportunity and Dependency

For Ghana, Libya, and Burkina Faso, the calculus is delicate.

For Ghana, the Western Corridor railway promises to boost cocoa and gold exports, easing bottlenecks that have hampered competitiveness. Rail revival could reduce transport costs by up to 40%, according to the AfDB, providing badly needed relief for exporters.

But the project comes at a sensitive time. Ghana’s debt-to-GDP ratio was 71% in 2024, and its IMF bailout necessitates fiscal discipline. A resource-backed loan deal with Russia might complicate negotiations with creditors and hinder financial reforms. Civil society groups are already calling for transparency. Kofi Bentil, a Ghanaian lawyer and policy analyst, previously warned that such deals, where future revenues are pledged for infrastructure, could leave the country financially bankrupt, essentially mortgaging its resources for decades.

Burkina Faso, a landlocked country battling jihadist insurgency, sees the Ouagadougou–Abidjan railway as vital for trade survival. Russia’s offer to modernize the line coincides with growing security cooperation, including military advisors and weapons deliveries.

For interim leader Captain Ibrahim Traoré, the partnership provides both legitimacy and leverage against Western critics. But analysts warn that intertwining security and economic deals risks deepening dependency.

Libya’s fragile post-conflict environment magnifies both promise and peril. Rail links could support reconstruction and jobs, yet weak governance makes exploitative deals far more likely to enrich elites than citizens.

Russia’s willingness to re-enter Libya’s volatile landscape signals a long game, according to  Jalel Harchaoui, a North Africa specialist and fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, a defence think tank based in London.

Beyond national contexts, the regional picture matters. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), launched in 2021, is projected by the World Bank to boost intra-African trade by 52% by 2035 if trade costs fall. Rail corridors are critical to realizing that vision, especially for landlocked economies like Burkina Faso or conflict-affected ones like Libya. But experts caution that if projects are financed through opaque, resource-backed deals, they risk undermining AfCFTA’s potential by locking countries into bilateral dependencies rather than building open, rules-based regional integration.

The stakes stretch beyond these three countries. Africa requires $130–170 billion annually for infrastructure, but actual spending averages $80 billion, leaving a yawning gap that forces nations toward alternative partners despite murky terms. Russia uses its Africa Summits to showcase partnership, but without transparency and accountability, projects risk becoming monuments to dependency rather than engines of growth.

Done well, with oversight and safeguards, Russia’s railway push could strengthen AfCFTA integration and regional trade. Done poorly, it could entrench geopolitical dependencies, constrain sovereignty, and leave behind tracks serving foreign patrons more than the people on the ground.

The Bigger Picture

Russia’s push into African rail fits into a broader pattern: a scramble for influence on a continent rich in resources but short on infrastructure financing. China dominates the space, Europe and the U.S. emphasize governance and transparency, while Turkey, India, and Gulf states also compete for deals. Moscow’s niche has been to offer “no-strings” arrangements, often attractive to governments under Western pressure—but the long-term costs remain uncertain.

For AfCFTA to succeed, infrastructure must enable competitive, transparent trade across borders—not just extractive flows of raw materials. As the African Union Commission has emphasized, rail networks are the backbone of regional industrialization and value chains. The danger, analysts warn, is that if foreign-backed projects primarily serve commodity exports or geopolitical logistics, they could entrench the very fragmentation AfCFTA was designed to overcome.

As Professor Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi, co-founder of Afrobarometer, has pointed out, African citizens remain committed to infrastructure and democratic governance, but governments are struggling to meet those expectations.

Russia’s railway ambitions in Ghana, Burkina Faso, and Libya illustrate both the promise and peril of Africa’s search for infrastructure partners. They could deliver badly needed connections that transform economies. Or they could deepen geopolitical troubles, leaving countries indebted and dependent.

For now, the real question is not whether Africa needs railways; it does. The question is whether these projects will be built on terms that serve African citizens, or whether they will serve Moscow’s strategic designs first.