The coup that sprang up in Mali in 2020 has since travelled across the West African sub-continent, leaving indelible marks in affected countries, as soldiers in khaki continue to abandon the barracks to grab power from democratically elected Presidents.
From Mali in 2020 and 2021, Guinea in 2021, a coup and counter-coup in Burkina Faso in 2022, coups in Niger in 2023, with a hiatus in 2024, and a resumption with a successful coup in Guinea Bissau in 2025, a failed coup attempt in Benin in 2025, and a reported failed coup plot in Nigeria in 2025; these series of events have reshaped the sociopolitical and economic landscape of the West African region.
As the year 2025 ends, the political demography of West Africa tells a troubling story. The coups, which earlier appeared as mere military takeovers in the Sahel, now look like an expanding circle of political instability. From Mali and Burkina Faso to Niger and Guinea, the attempt in Benin, and reports in Nigeria, these coup incidents no longer look like temporary ruptures. Rather, they’re consolidating into a pattern; one which, in 2025, gravitated more closely to the coastal states in the region, raising fears that military rule was becoming an accepted alternative to civilian government in West Africa.
For many across the region, the idea of a “coup belt” was no longer an abstract security concept. It is now being felt by people in the region due to closed borders, disrupted trade routes, and the uncertainty of a stable democracy in the region.
These expansions, experts warn, signal something deeper than dissatisfaction with elected leaders. Many have argued that they’re resultant effects of misgovernance by democratically elected leaders or leaders who clandestinely obtained power through the ballot.
“The recent coups in the Sahel, especially the incidents in 2025 across West Africa, have not in any way been the cause of insurgency as insurgency had been in place in the region before the coups that started in 2020,” security expert and analyst Afolabi Solanke told OpenAfricanTribune, adding that “the coups are effects of misgovernance in the region.”
Nigeria, which is situated very close to these countries that have now been overtaken by a military junta, has watched this unfolding crisis from an uneasy position; too close to remain unaffected, too influential in the region to remain neutral. The failed December coup in neighbouring Benin Republic in 2025 brought these tensions sharply into focus. The Nigerian responded swiftly with diplomatic pressure, security and military intervention, and consultations with regional partners, particularly ECOWAS, conscious of the risks posed by instability along its borders. Yet the response also exposed Nigeria’s dilemma: acting decisively without appearing overbearing in a region increasingly wary of dominance by its largest power.
The unease became more pronounced and justified following the arrest of Nigerian Air Force soldiers by the Burkina Faso military junta. The incident, though officially treated as a security matter, carried symbolic weight. It reflected a very recent deep mistrust that has grown between military-led governments and their democratic neighbours in West Africa.
It was proof that the assumptions about regional solidarity and military cooperation between these countries were breaking down.
Where shared security concerns once encouraged collaboration, suspicion now defines engagement.
Nigeria’s Defence Headquarters and the Ministry of Defence did not respond to inquiries from OpenAfricanTribune concerning the effect of the military coups on the security situation in the country.
The Dwindling Relevance of ECOWAS
For the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the organisation is struggling to keep up with the speed and scale of political upheaval in the region. ECOWAS, once seen as a firm defender of constitutional order, spent much of 2025 navigating internal divisions and open defiance from junta-led states, with countries led by military governments pulling out of the organisation.
Surprisingly, there have been no effective sanctions against the military regimes, a situation that has left citizens and analysts questioning whether ECOWAS still possesses the authority to deter future coups and restore democratic norms in West Africa. However, despite its shortcomings, ECOWAS remains the only organisation capable of coordinating a collective response to stabilise the region. Such action, many believe, is preferable to fragmented, unilateral actions by individual countries like Nigeria and Cote D’Ivoire, among others.
As an acclaimed “Big Brother,” Nigeria’s approach towards instability in the region has often contrasted with that of other West African countries. While other neighbouring countries usually opt for quiet diplomacy, Nigeria has repeatedly stepped forward as a regional leader, many times at high political cost.
One of such examples was Nigeria’s intervention in thwarting the coup in the Benin Republic by deploying air and ground troops to the neighbouring country.
Nigeria’s President Bola Tinubu had also continued to intervene in the affairs of Guinea-Bissau, as he approved the provision of protection and security in the premises of the Nigerian Embassy in the Republic of Guinea-Bissau for Fernando Dia Da Costa, the country’s main opposition candidate in the country’s most recent presidential election.
Mr Tinubu’s decision, the Nigerian government said, was a proactive measure to ensure the safety of Mr Da Costa, in response to imminent threats to his life, following a coup that took place a few hours before the announcement of an election where he was reportedly leading.
The coup in Guinea-Bissau was believed to have been orchestrated by the country’s incumbent President, Umaro Embaló. Mr Embalo, whose term officially ends in February, sought to be the first president in 30 years to secure a second consecutive term.
The election had pitted Mr Embalo, candidate of the Madem‑G15 party, against Mr Da Costa, who was the leading opposition candidate of the Party for Social Renewal (PRS).
However, barely 24 hours before the declaration of the winner of the presidential election by the country’s electoral commission, Mr Embaló announced to journalists that a coup had taken place in the country. First of its kind anywhere in the world, where a sitting president would announce a coup against his government.
However, Nigeria’s former President, Goodluck Jonathan, confirmed the suspicion, alleging that Mr Embaló had staged the military coup in Guinea-Bissau to avoid losing the presidential election. Mr Jonathan said the military takeover was a “ceremonial coup” and demanded that the election results be announced.
However, beyond governments, ordinary people, common citizens bear the consequences of prolonged instability due to military dictatorships. Trades along the border communities have been greatly affected. However, young people express fading confidence in democratic promises, this is as families recount the fear of living under military regimes, or having their country ruled by a dictator.
These voices, often absent from official communiqués, reveal the human cost of coups and counter-coups, a cost that continues to mount as instability spreads.
As West Africa moves into 2026, the questions raised by 2025 remain unresolved. Will the region find a way to halt the spread of military rule, or will coups continue to reshape its political landscape? Much of this will depend on Nigeria’s ability to balance leadership with restraint and on whether ECOWAS could reclaim its role as a credible force for stability in the region.
However, what is clear is that 2025 was not just another year; it was a year of political disruptions through the barrels of guns rather than through the ballot, a situation that West Africa cannot afford to ignore.
The stakes are higher than ever, as the consequences of inaction could lead to further instability and unrest. As the international community watches closely, the region must navigate these challenges with urgency and strategic foresight.
