On May 31, 2017, a passenger train departed from Mombasa, commencing its four-hour journey to Nairobi. The Standard Gauge Railway (SGR), built by China Road and Bridge Corporation and financed mainly by Chinese loans, was celebrated as Kenya’s largest infrastructure project since independence. For ordinary Kenyans, it promised faster travel and modern convenience. For policymakers, it represented a leap in connectivity. Yet, for critics, the Standard Gauge Railway was also a cautionary tale, a polished symbol of ambition tied tightly to billions in external debt.

Across Africa, China has enthroned itself as the continent’s most ambitious builder, lender, and sometimes landlord. From railways to ports, dams to highways, Beijing’s imprint is visible almost everywhere. But as the continent rides these new links of steel and asphalt, a lingering question remains: is this a lifeline for Africa’s development or a debt trap tightening its grip?

What Makes China So Attractive to African Governments?

Over the past two decades, China has become Africa’s most prolific financier and builder of infrastructure. What makes China so attractive to African governments? For many African leaders, the appeal lies in the speed and flexibility of Chinese financing.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) or World Bank is a major lender to African countries, and often, loans are tied to reforms in governance, anti-corruption measures, or austerity programmes. On the other hand, Beijing offers funding with fewer political strings attached. Money tends to arrive faster, with less bureaucracy, and is directed into visible projects such as highways, ports, or railways, the kind of investments that citizens can see and politicians can point to as evidence of progress.

According to the China Africa Research Initiative (CARI) at Johns Hopkins University, China provided more than $153 billion in loans to African countries between 2000 and 2019. The funds were earmarked for large-scale infrastructure. A World Bank report noted that Chinese development banks have become the largest source of infrastructure.

In Ethiopia, Chinese funding is responsible for the construction of the Addis Ababa–Djibouti Railway, linking a landlocked country to a port lifeline. In Nigeria, Chinese-backed projects revived rail lines such as the Abuja/Kaduna route, which was neglected due to strained domestic budgets. Angola, rich in oil but scarred by civil war, leveraged its petroleum to secure Chinese loans that built highways, hospitals, and dams.

Today, across the continent, ports, special economic zones, and even data centers bear Chinese footprints, often operated by Chinese companies, sometimes staffed predominantly by Chinese engineers.

The Promise and the Burden in Kenya

At first, the Standard Gauge Railway was hailed as a modern symbol of Kenya’s leap into the future, but beneath the glossy carriages and ribbon-cutting ceremonies, the numbers began to tell a different story.

Kenya Railways’ records show that while the line earned about KSh 10 billion in freight and passenger revenue in a year, the cost of running it was almost double, close to KSh 18 billion. “It has never broken even,” admitted one Nairobi-based transport analyst, noting that every trip of the shiny red-and-grey locomotive is effectively underwritten by taxpayers.

By 2024, loans tied to the SGR had swelled to KSh 737 billion, more than half of all on-lent debt to the agency. Servicing those loans is now eating into Kenya’s already stretched budget. Treasury figures show repayments rising from KSh 31 billion in 2020 to over KSh 84 billion, with projections to climb past KSh 111 billion in the coming year.

What began as a promise of regional integration is increasingly viewed as a fiscal albatross.

“The SGR was supposed to pay for itself,” a Kenyan MP told Business Daily. “Instead, it has become one of the most expensive subsidies in our history.”

Modernization on Borrowed Tracks

In Nigeria, China has emerged as the backbone of major railway and power projects. The Abuja/ Kaduna railway and the Lagos/Ibadan line, both financed and built by Chinese contractors, have become symbols of modernization for Nigeria but also of rising debt.

Between 2000 and 2022, Nigeria’s borrowing from China surged drastically, climbing from US$1.4 billion in 2015 to about US$4.3 billion by the end of 2022, according to the country’s Debt Management Office (DMO). That figure now makes up nearly 85% of Nigeria’s total bilateral debt, underscoring how dependent Africa’s largest economy has become on Beijing’s loans.

Opponents worry that the pace of borrowing has outstripped Nigeria’s ability to repay, especially given its persistent revenue challenges.

“The projects are important, no doubt,” noted a Lagos-based economist in a BusinessDay report, “but the repayment terms and the heavy tilt toward one lender create long-term vulnerabilities.”

Angola: Oil-Backed Dependence

Emerging from nearly three decades of civil war, Angola turned to Beijing in the early 2000s, pledging oil as collateral for billions in infrastructure financing. Roads, hospitals, and housing projects sprang up almost overnight.

By 2020, Angola owed US$20.1 billion to China, making it Beijing’s single largest African debtor, according to the China Africa Research Initiative (CARI) at Johns Hopkins University. Much of this debt was serviced through oil shipments: at one point, nearly 40% of Angola’s crude exports went directly to China to repay loans.

But the commodity-backed model has proven volatile. When global oil prices collapsed in 2014 and again in 2020, Angola’s repayment capacity plunged, forcing Luanda to renegotiate terms with Chinese creditors. Citizens of Angola have mixed views.

“Yes, Luanda has new expressways and hospitals,” says António Miguel, a taxi driver in the capital. “But what good are highways if jobs are still scarce and food prices keep rising?”.  

Meanwhile, economic pundits in Angola have echoed their concerns on the reliance on oil-for-loans, saying it erodes sovereignty and deepens fiscal vulnerability.

Ethiopia, Djibouti Connectivity with Costs

For landlocked Ethiopia, Chinese financing delivered a historic milestone, the US$4.5 billion Addis Ababa–Djibouti Railway, Africa’s first fully electrified transboundary line. Built by China Railway Engineering Corporation and China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation, the railway cut cargo travel time from three days by truck to just 12 hours by rail.

The promise was enormous. Industrial parks sprouted along the line, and policymakers in Addis Ababa hailed it as a cornerstone of Ethiopia’s manufacturing ambitions, but the financial strain has been heavy. By 2018, Ethiopia had already sought debt restructuring from China, unable to keep pace with repayments.  Djibouti, hosting the other end of the line, has also seen its debt-to-GDP ratio soar past 100%, much of it owed to Chinese lenders, according to the IMF.

“We welcome the railway, but tickets are expensive, and the jobs mostly went to Chinese engineers,” says Hirut Alemayehu, a small trader in Dire Dawa. “It feels like we are paying twice, once through taxes and again at the station.”

At the same time, Ethiopia’s Transport Ministry has argued that a long-term investment in connectivity  will eventually reduce logistics costs and boost trade competitiveness.

Cost of the Addis Ababa–Djibouti Railway.

Ethiopia’s partnership with China produced the Addis Ababa–Djibouti Railway, the first fully electrified trans-boundary railway in Africa. It cut cargo travel time from three days by truck to just 12 hours by rail.

For a landlocked country of 120 million people, this was a game-changer. Industrial parks sprouted along the railway, and Ethiopia envisioned itself as an African manufacturing hub.

But the project was financed by over $4 billion in Chinese loans, and repayment has proven difficult. By 2018, Ethiopia had already sought debt restructuring.

Djibouti, hosting the other end of the line, saw its debt-to-GDP ratio soar to over 100%, much of it owed to China. This raised fears of a “debt trap”, especially as Djibouti also hosts China’s first overseas military base, blurring lines between commercial and strategic interests.

Control, Capacity, Who Really Benefits?

Beyond the billions, there is the question of control. Many Chinese-funded projects are designed, built, and operated by Chinese contractors, with only limited transfer of skills to local engineers. This raises concerns about long-term sustainability.

In Kenya, the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) was initially operated by China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) under a management contract until 2022. A Kenyan parliamentary committee report criticized the arrangement for sidelining local staff in technical roles. The Kenya Railways Workers Union also accused CRBC of “deliberate exclusion” of Kenyan engineers. In Ethiopia, Chinese firms dominate management of industrial parks, including Hawassa Industrial Park. A Brookings Institution study noted that while the parks created thousands of jobs, most senior technical and managerial positions remained in Chinese hands, limiting skills transfer.

In Angola, infrastructure projects have long relied on imported labour. According to Human Rights Watch and subsequent analyses by the China Africa Research Initiative (SAIS-CARI), Chinese companies often bring in their construction workers and materials, leaving few opportunities for Angolan contractors or suppliers. For African governments, the challenge is not just securing financing, but ensuring projects build domestic capacity, not just physical infrastructure. As one African Development Bank (AfDB) policy brief put it: “Infrastructure without capacity is dependency by another name.”

Lifeline or Debt Trap?

By 2023, African governments collectively owed China between $143 billion and $182 billion, according to data compiled by the China Africa Research Initiative at Johns Hopkins University. For some, this figure alone fuels the idea of a looming debt crisis. The debate over whether these loans amount to a “debt trap” has become one of the most polarising discussions about China’s role on the continent.

Critics argue that Beijing deliberately extends unsustainable loans to seize strategic assets when countries falter on repayments, pointing to Sri-Lanka’s loss of Hambantota Port on a 99-year lease as a cautionary tale. In Africa, whispers and warnings echo around high-profile projects: Kenya’s Standard Gauge Railway, Uganda’s planned oil pipeline, and ports in Djibouti and Angola. The fear is simple: what happens if governments cannot keep up with repayment?

China rejects this charge. Officials in Beijing insist that its loans are development-driven, not predatory, and they point to examples of loan restructuring, deferment, or even forgiveness. In Ethiopia, for example, repayment schedules for railway loans were renegotiated. In Zambia, Beijing has written off portions of debt while still financing other infrastructure projects.

As Professor Lina Zhang of the Center for Global Development explains:

“The debt trap narrative oversimplifies. The reality is that African governments actively seek Chinese loans because they meet urgent infrastructure needs. The problem is not just China’s lending practices but also Africa’s debt management and governance.”

Many analysts say, Chinese loans have certainly pushed some African countries into difficult positions. Zambia became the first African nation to default during the COVID-19 pandemic, with Chinese lenders among its largest creditors. But unlike the image of a single, calculating Beijing pulling strings, the reality is that debt negotiations involve multiple banks, state-owned firms, and ministries, often working at different speeds.

Still, the political cost of debt is undeniable. In Kenya, the rising repayment burden for the SGR has become a rallying cry for opposition leaders, who accuse the government of mortgaging the nation’s future. In Nigeria, officials have had to publicly reassure citizens that no national asset has been signed away as collateral after reports circulated that Chinese loan contracts included sovereignty clauses.

What Next?

Western powers have promised to “compete” with China in Africa, but so far, the gap remains glaring. The G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), announced with fanfare in 2021, has yet to deliver projects on a scale that rivals Beijing’s highways, ports, and railways.

Europe’s Global Gateway has pledged €300 billion globally, but only a fraction is earmarked for Africa, and even less has moved from promise to concrete. In the meantime, China’s footprint continues to expand. From the Djibouti port that anchors Beijing’s first overseas military base, to the Lagos–Ibadan railway that has transformed Nigeria’s commuter corridors, the reality is that China remains unrivalled in speed and scale.

Yet the future may not belong to China alone. Other actors are quietly edging into the field. Turkey has built airports and mosques from Mogadishu to Niamey, using soft power as a bridge to commercial ties. India is investing in digital infrastructure and pharmaceuticals, betting on Africa’s tech-savvy youth. The Gulf states, flush with oil wealth, are pouring money into agribusiness and ports to secure food and trade routes.

For African governments, this shifting landscape presents both opportunity and risk. The opportunity lies in diversifying partners, no longer relying solely on Beijing but drawing from a wider pool of lenders and investors. The risk is being caught in a new scramble for Africa, where global powers compete not for territory, but for influence through roads, cables, and contracts.

Crucially, the balance will depend on transparency and governance at home. Renegotiating opaque Chinese contracts, as seen in Zambia’s recent debt restructuring, shows it is possible to push back. Strengthening parliamentary oversight and involving civil society in contract monitoring could help ensure infrastructure deals deliver for citizens, not just elites.

At the end of the day, the question is not whether Africa needs infrastructure; the answer to that is obvious. Roads, ports, power, and railways are the arteries of development. The real question is: on whose terms is Africa’s future being built?

For a commuter boarding the morning train in Nairobi, or a trader shipping goods through Lagos, the immediate benefits of Chinese projects are tangible. But whether these steel tracks and concrete highways become stepping stones to prosperity or chains of dependency will depend not only on Beijing’s intentions, but on Africa’s own choices.

The continent stands at a crossroads. The challenge now is not just to build, but to build wisely to ensure that in the rush to connect cities and power homes, Africa does not mortgage its sovereignty. Because the real story is not just about trains or ports. It is about who truly owns the future being laid down, mile by mile, across Africa’s landscape.