Terrorist organisations are no longer fighting only with weapons. Increasingly, they are exploiting digital technologies to spread propaganda, recruit followers and coordinate operations across borders. In 2024, reports that the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) planned to launch an online radio station known as Radio Raeed attracted significant attention among security observers.
Although the station has not been independently verified as operational and reliable public information about it remains limited, the reports have raised concerns among security experts. They warn that if such a platform eventually becomes active, it could strengthen extremist messaging and pose new security risks for communities already affected by insurgency.
Beyond whether Radio Raeed has been launched, the discussions surrounding it point to a much broader issue: the steady evolution of extremist communication.
Over the years, violent groups have continuously adapted to new technologies, often changing their methods faster than governments and regulators can respond. The reported online radio project offers an opportunity to examine how extremist organisations are reshaping their communication strategies in the digital age.
The Evolution of Extremist Communication
The use of communication as a tool by extremist organisations is not new. Long before the rise of social media, these groups relied on the most accessible technologies of their time to spread ideology and maintain contact with supporters.
During the 1970s and 1980s, extremist messages were largely distributed through printed pamphlets, handwritten newsletters and audio cassette tapes. These methods allowed organisations to circulate ideological materials within communities despite limited communication infrastructure.
The emergence of the internet in the 1990s marked a turning point. Extremist groups increasingly shifted their attention online, taking advantage of websites, email and downloadable audio recordings that could be copied and shared with ease, particularly in areas with low literacy levels.
Following the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks in the United States, governments around the world tightened surveillance of extremist communication channels. Rather than slowing their activities, however, the increased pressure encouraged further innovation.
By the late 2000s and early 2010s, groups had moved onto major social media platforms such as Facebook, YouTube and Twitter. These platforms enabled them to distribute videos instantly, communicate directly with sympathisers and amplify their narratives to audiences across the world.
As technology companies strengthened content moderation and removed extremist accounts, many organisations migrated to encrypted messaging applications including Telegram, WhatsApp, Rocket. Chat and other private communication platforms. This pattern of adaptation has continued, with communication methods evolving alongside technological change.
Why an Online Radio Station Matters
The reported plan to establish an online radio station reflects this continuing evolution rather than a completely new strategy. Digital media has become an essential part of today’s security environment because it enables the rapid exchange of information during conflicts, emergencies and humanitarian crises.
However, the same technologies have also created new opportunities for misinformation, extremist propaganda and other forms of cyber-enabled crime. Unlike social media posts that often disappear within rapidly changing algorithms, online radio offers continuity. Scheduled broadcasts create a predictable routine that audiences can follow, making it easier for regular listeners to stay connected with a particular source of information or ideology.
Streaming audio also requires far less internet data than video while still allowing organisations to deliver ideological messages, commentary and operational updates. In regions where internet connectivity is limited or expensive, this makes audio broadcasting particularly attractive.
Another advantage is that online radio avoids many of the regulatory barriers associated with conventional broadcasting. Traditional FM radio depends on broadcast licences, transmission infrastructure and geographical coverage limitations. Internet-based radio, by contrast, can operate from servers located in different countries, making regulation and enforcement considerably more difficult.
For security experts, these characteristics explain why reports of Radio Raeed have attracted attention. Even if the station has yet to become operational, the concept aligns with the broader trend of extremist organisations adopting digital tools that allow them to communicate more consistently, reach wider audiences and operate beyond conventional regulatory controls.
The Digital Propaganda Shift Across the Sahel
The evolution of extremist communication is also evident across the wider Sahel, where armed groups have increasingly integrated digital technologies into recruitment, propaganda and organisational coordination.
Organisations operating in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and parts of Chad have steadily expanded their online presence over the past decade. The Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), formed in Mali in 2017, has relied on encrypted messaging platforms and online videos to expand its influence across West Africa.
Similarly, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), before its incorporation into the ISWAP structure, used digital propaganda to reinforce its links with the wider Islamic State media network. The rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria between 2014 and 2019 further accelerated this trend. During the same period, ISWAP expanded its own digital presence, publishing videos that claimed responsibility for attacks, threatened government officials and promoted ideological narratives.
These developments demonstrate that communication is no longer merely a supporting element of extremist operations. Increasingly, recruitment, fundraising, ideological reinforcement, psychological warfare and misinformation are conducted online, often reaching audiences thousands of kilometres away from active conflict zones.
Lessons From Other Conflict Zones
Nigeria is not alone in witnessing the evolution of extremist communication. Across different conflict zones, violent extremist organisations have consistently demonstrated an ability to adapt to emerging technologies, often moving faster than governments and regulators can respond.
In Somalia, Al-Shabaab has spent more than a decade refining its communication strategy. The group initially relied on local radio broadcasts and community networks before gradually expanding into digital media. It used multiple online platforms to circulate battlefield updates, ideological lectures, recruitment messages, and statements after attacks.
Even after technology companies repeatedly suspended its accounts, the group resurfaced under new accounts or redirected followers to encrypted messaging platforms. This highlights the difficulty of permanently disrupting extremist communication networks. The Taliban followed a similar path. During the early years of its insurgency, the movement largely communicated through telephone interviews, printed statements and cassette recordings.
As internet access expanded, it established multilingual websites, built an active social media presence and increasingly relied on encrypted messaging platforms to communicate with supporters and journalists. By the time it returned to power in Afghanistan in 2021, the group had become highly sophisticated in using digital communication to project military strength, shape political narratives and influence international opinion.
Perhaps no organisation has demonstrated the power of digital propaganda more than ISIS. Between 2014 and 2019, it transformed terrorist communication into an integrated media operation. Through publications such as Dabiq and Rumiyah, podcasts, encrypted messaging channels and coordinated social media campaigns, ISIS projected a global image that attracted recruits from dozens of countries.
Rather than simply claiming responsibility for attacks, the organisation relied on storytelling, emotional narratives and professionally produced content to portray life under its so-called caliphate as attractive and purposeful. In doing so, it built online communities that reinforced identity and sustained ideological commitment.
These experiences suggest that the reported development of Radio Raeed fits within a broader global pattern. Extremist organisations rarely abandon existing communication methods. Instead, they continue to build on them by integrating newer technologies into their operations.
Why Extremist Groups Continue to Adapt
The continuous evolution of extremist communication reflects a pattern of adaptation. Each time governments strengthen surveillance or technology companies improve content moderation, extremist organisations adjust their methods.
When websites became more difficult to operate, they shifted to social media. As social media platforms increased moderation and removed extremist accounts, many groups migrated to encrypted messaging applications. With greater scrutiny now placed on encrypted platforms, some organisations have diversified further by exploring private forums, satellite internet services and other digital tools.
This constant adaptation demonstrates that communication has become as strategically important as territorial control. It is no longer only about spreading ideology but also about maintaining organisational cohesion, recruiting supporters and sustaining influence across borders.
Within this context, an online radio station presents several advantages. It can be hosted on servers outside the country where listeners are located, making enforcement significantly more difficult. Also, audio content remains accessible because it consumes less internet data than video.
Security experts further note that regular audio programmes can build familiarity and trust among listeners in much the same way as traditional radio programmes or podcasts. From this perspective, the reported Radio Raeed appears less like a revolutionary innovation and more like an adaptation of an established communication method to suit today’s digital environment.
Nigeria’s Response
Nigeria has gradually expanded its counterterrorism strategy beyond conventional military operations to address the growing role of digital technologies in extremist activities.
The National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), established under the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA), coordinates intelligence gathering, strategic planning and operational collaboration among the military, intelligence services, law enforcement agencies and other relevant institutions.
In recent years, the NCTC has acknowledged that extremist organisations increasingly exploit digital technologies for propaganda, recruitment, financing and operational coordination.
This recognition has informed the ongoing review of Nigeria’s National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST), which seeks to incorporate emerging technological threats into the country’s broader security framework.
According to the NCTC’s National Coordinator, Major General Adamu Laka, the revised strategy adopts a “whole-of-government and whole-of-society” approach by bringing together security agencies, government ministries, civil society organisations, academia and international partners to counter extremist narratives alongside military operations.
Beyond the NCTC, the Office of the National Security Adviser plays a broader coordinating role by integrating intelligence from multiple agencies while overseeing national security policy and responses to emerging threats, including cyber-enabled terrorism.
The Department of State Services (DSS) also contributes through domestic intelligence gathering and internal security operations.
Although much of its work remains confidential, the agency is widely recognised for monitoring activities linked to terrorism and threats to national security, including those occurring within digital spaces.
Nigeria’s telecommunications regulator, the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC), has also assumed an increasingly important role.
While it does not conduct counterterrorism operations, it works with service providers on lawful directives relating to communications infrastructure, subscriber identification and regulatory compliance. This places the Commission in an important position whenever investigations involve digital communications.
Similarly, agencies such as the National Information Technology Development Agency (NITDA), working alongside ONSA, contribute to strengthening Nigeria’s cyber resilience through policy development, cybersecurity awareness and digital infrastructure protection.
Together, these institutions reflect Nigeria’s growing recognition that terrorism can no longer be addressed through military operations alone. At the same time, civil society organisations, religious leaders and community groups remain essential partners in countering misinformation, promoting credible alternative narratives and strengthening trust between citizens and the state.
Ultimately, no single institution can counter extremist communication alone. The most effective responses combine sound legislation, capable security agencies, responsible technology companies, independent journalism and informed citizens.
While extremist groups continue to adapt to new technologies, resilience will depend not only on removing harmful content but also on building societies that are better equipped to recognise, reject and resist violent extremist narratives before they expand.
