On a dusty roadside near Tengrela, a quiet border town in northern Côte d’Ivoire, the human cost of war unfolds in silence. Exhausted families continue to arrive in waves, barefoot children, elderly women leaning on sticks, and men pushing whatever belongings survived the chaos. Many come with nothing but fear in their eyes and hope in their hands.

Among them is 32-year-old Awa Traoré, fleeing from Mali’s Mopti region after armed men believed to be linked to the al-Qaeda affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) stormed her village.

“They burned homes and killed people who resisted. We left everything behind. My husband stayed with the animals. I don’t know if he is alive,” she narrated.

Her story mirrors thousands of others who have crossed into Côte d’Ivoire between August and October 2025, a movement the Ivorian government now describes as an “unusual flow of refugees.”

Following a security briefing to President Alassane Ouattara on October 30, 2025, Côte d’Ivoire’s National Security Council (NSC) confirmed the surge was directly linked to expanding jihadist operations targeting civilians in southern Mali.

In response, the Executive Secretary of the NSC was ordered to register and screen asylum seekers. The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces deployed additional troops to reinforce the northern border.

Surveillance and intelligence operations were expanded to prevent infiltration by armed militants.

These measures come as Côte d’Ivoire already shelters approximately 90,000 refugees from Burkina Faso, displaced by similar insurgency conditions sweeping the Sahel.

President Ouattara commended security forces for preserving stability during the October 2025 presidential election and urged continued vigilance ahead of legislative polls expected in early 2026.

What Triggered the Mass Flight?

The root cause lies in Mali’s growing insecurity. JNIM, formed in 2017 through the merger of AQIM, Ansar Dine, Macina Liberation Front, and al-Mourabitoun, has evolved into West Africa’s most aggressive militant network, according to Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) conflict monitors.

Its operational footprint now spans: Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Ghana, Benin, Togo, and Côte d’Ivoire. Also, as of late 2025, Nigeria was included in the list.

In September 2025, JNIM intensified economic pressure by banning fuel tankers from entering Mali through Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal, triggering fuel scarcity and price surges in Bamako.

By late October 2025, the group launched its first recorded attack in Nigeria, killing a soldier and stealing weapons and cash, a chilling sign of regional expansion.

Civilian death tolls remain unclear, but conflict observers estimate thousands killed since 2017.

Violence from Multiple Fronts

JNIM is not the only threat. Many refugees report fleeing not only jihadist attacks but also abusive military operations linked to the Russian Wagner Group, operating in Mali under the junta that took power in 2020.

According to ACLED research lead Héni Nsaibia, “These fighters kill indiscriminately. Wagner-linked operations killed at least 925 civilians in 2024, more than double the deaths attributed to Islamist militants that same year.”

Satellite analysis from CSIS confirms increased Russian military presence and new infrastructure expansions at Bamako’s Modibo Keita Airport between February and April 2025, suggesting further militarization rather than stabilization.

Mapping the Violence

The worst-hit regions include: Ménaka with persistent attacks, looting, and disrupted trade routes. Kidal, with its long-standing militant and military operations.

Timbuktu is experiencing a siege and forced evacuations. Gao has equally witnessed repeated attacks destroying markets and livelihoods, and Mopti (Bandiagara, Bankass) with frequent massacres, including the May 2025 killing of 22 Fulani men in Diafarabé.

The violence has expanded south and west into Ségou, Koulikoro, and Kayes, pushing displacement closer to Côte d’Ivoire and other coastal states.

The Journey: Danger, Loss, and Uncertainty

Refugees often travel through unofficial border paths to avoid militants, military checkpoints, or extortion points. Many walked for days with no food or water.

For many, the journey brought security threats, including kidnapping and rape, loss of livestock, especially among Fulani pastoralists, economic collapse, with fuel blockades raising transportation costs.

Also, family separation occurred, with men often staying behind to protect land or animals, and a serious humanitarian strain overwhelmed the border community, already struggling with limited services.

Noted that, women and children make up to 80% of arrivals, making them vulnerable to exploitation, trafficking, and illness.

Ivory Coast Responds: Protection, But Not Enough

Since mid-2025, Côte d’Ivoire has attempted to balance security control with refugee protection. A decree issued on July 2, 2025, formally granted refugee status to thousands of Malians and Burkinabè, guaranteeing, Non-refoulement, movement rights, access to legal documentation, and eligibility for services such as health and education.

Authorities, working with UNHCR, ACTED, UNICEF, IOM, and WFP, are registering refugees and supporting vulnerable groups. But the system is strained. Humanitarian teams report shortages and overcrowding in Doropo, Bouna, Tengrela, and Niablé, with aid capacity overwhelmed by the rate of arrivals.

Host Communities: Compassion and Concern

Local communities have responded with solidarity, offering farmland, water, and temporary shelter even when their own resources are limited.

Yet patience has limits. Farmers worry about future tensions over land, grazing routes, schools, health centers, and scarce water points.

This coexistence remains peaceful for now, but without long-term government and humanitarian investment, the pressure could deepen social fault lines.

Loss Beyond Borders: Identity, Dignity, and Memory

For many refugees, displacement is not only physical, but it is a cultural and spiritual rupture. Former herder Nouhoun Sidibè, now surviving in a makeshift shelter near Doropo, captures this pain like this: “I feel very, very lost. I was a chief, and now I work for someone else.”

“There is no Fulani without his cattle. When they burned our pens, they burned our life,” said Hamadou Diallo, a displaced herder from the Bankass axis.

Their words echo the emotional trauma that statistics can never fully capture.

Across the Sahel, the displacement crisis far exceeds Mali’s borders: UNHCR reports millions uprooted by conflict, climate shocks, and institutional collapse.

Mauritania’s Mbera camp, for instance, now hosts tens of thousands of Malians, while Burkina Faso remains one of the world’s fastest-growing displacement hotspots.

These pressures intersect with rising insecurity, deteriorating intelligence-sharing among regional states, and a shrinking governance footprint in rural zones, producing a cross-border emergency that neither Mali nor Côte d’Ivoire is fully equipped to manage.

A Regional Crisis with Wider Implications

Across Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mauritania, more than five million people are displaced as of September 2025, according to UNHCR.

Mauritania’s Mbera Camp now hosts 149,000 refugees, tripling its 2023 population.

Security analysts warn that without proper strengthening of intelligence sharing, coordinated humanitarian support, and effective rule-of-law reform, the instability may spread deeper into coastal West Africa.

A Sahel expert in Abidjan summarized the concern thus: “The threat isn’t just refugee movement, it’s the possibility of armed infiltration.”

“It Can Happen Anywhere”

Analysts caution that while each country’s situation is unique, several structural factors identified in regional assessments offer important clues.

 Ghana, Togo, Benin, and Niger share the same challenges of porous borders, weak state presence in rural regions, growing jihadist cells, climate-driven resource stress, and fragile economies, making similar displacement scenarios likely if violence escalates.

The growing outflow of civilians from Mali into northern Côte d’Ivoire has raised a broader question among regional observers: could similar displacement patterns emerge in other West African states facing insecurity?

 “According to Paul Melly of Chatham House, the departure of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger from ECOWAS reflects deeper structural challenges that could influence displacement in border regions.”

 “UNHCR’s Abdouraouf Gnon-Konde notes that conflict-driven displacement continues to rise across West Africa, underscoring the humanitarian dimension of the shifting security landscape.”

According to humanitarian analysts tracking the Sahel crisis, the conditions driving Malians across the Tengrela border, community-level violence, pressure from armed groups, and the erosion of state protection, mirror early-warning indicators flagged in ECOWAS and UNOWAS security briefs.

Both institutions have repeatedly warned that when rural governance collapses, and armed actors compete for territorial control, cross-border displacement becomes almost inevitable.

Conflict-mapping organisations, including ACLED, have also documented a steady expansion of violent incidents across border corridors linking Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.

While their data does not predict future displacement, it shows where civilians face growing exposure to attacks, thereby helping humanitarian agencies anticipate pressure points.

Analysts at the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS Africa) note that populations living near porous borders, especially farmers, herders, and traders, are often the first to flee when armed groups shift operational zones.

However, think-tank assessments emphasise that Côte d’Ivoire is not necessarily a template for all neighbouring countries.

States with stronger local governance structures, more visible security deployments, or established community-early-warning systems may be better positioned to absorb shocks.

In contrast, countries contending with stretched security forces or unresolved local grievances could experience spikes in internal displacement or cross-border movement if violence escalates.

Ultimately, experts stress that the likelihood of similar displacement crises elsewhere hinges on how governments respond to insecurity within their border regions.

Strengthening civilian protection, rebuilding trust with rural communities, and coordinating early-warning mechanisms across ECOWAS remain the most consistent recommendations across regional analyses.

Without these safeguards, humanitarian agencies warn that vulnerable border populations across the Sahel and coastal West Africa may continue to move in search of safety just as Malians are now doing along the Tengrela frontier.

A Regional Crisis with Wider Implications

ECOWAS, UNHCR, IOM, UNICEF, WFP, ACTED, WAHO, and local agencies are coordinating refugee registration, health interventions, food distribution, education access, child protection, border security support, and social cohesion initiatives. Their work blends emergency response with long-term resilience planning.

Across the Sahel, the crisis unfolding in Mali is part of a much larger regional emergency that is placing extraordinary strain on neighbouring states.

 According to UNHCR, more than five million people across Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mauritania are currently displaced as of September 2025, a scale of movement that is reshaping humanitarian and security priorities across West Africa. This rising pressure is not confined to any single border.

Mauritania’s Mbera Camp, for instance, now shelters nearly 149,000 refugees, triple its 2023 population. The rapid expansion of the camp underscores how the shockwaves from Mali’s conflict are pushing states far beyond the immediate frontline to absorb growing numbers of civilians fleeing violence.

 What happens in central Mali is no longer a localised problem; it is forcing entire countries to confront the limits of their humanitarian capacity.

These escalating displacement needs are unfolding at the same time that regional security cooperation is weakening. Intelligence-sharing, once a crucial tool for tracking militant movements and protecting border populations, has deteriorated in recent years, particularly after Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger withdrew from ECOWAS structures.

This breakdown makes it harder for governments to anticipate cross-border attacks or coordinate responses when civilians begin to flee.

In effect, the humanitarian and security dimensions of the crisis are now feeding into each other. Overstretched camps and rising refugee flows strain national resources, while weakened intelligence networks reduce the ability of states to stabilise border regions, conditions that, in turn, create more displacement.

The result is a regional system under cumulative pressure: camps expanding faster than they can be supported, borders becoming harder to secure, and communities from the Sahel to coastal West Africa increasingly exposed to a cycle of violence and flight that no single country can manage alone.

Policy Recommendations: Avoiding a Permanent Crisis

The policy recommendations outlined in the story are not personal views; they reflect conclusions drawn from regional security bodies, humanitarian agencies, and independent analysts who track Sahel instability.

According to ECOWAS early-warning reports and UNOWAS security assessments, strengthening cross-border intelligence sharing and restoring state presence in rural zones are essential to preventing further displacement.

Both institutions have repeatedly warned that without coordinated border security frameworks, civilians will continue to flee whenever armed groups expand into new areas.

Humanitarian agencies, including UNHCR, IOM, UNICEF, and WFP, also recommend standardized refugee protection systems, better registration processes, and expanded livelihood programmes to help states manage large-scale arrivals.

UNHCR officials emphasise that sustainable refugee management must combine humanitarian assistance with community integration and local development planning.

Independent experts echo these concerns. Idayat Hassan of the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD), Fahiraman Koné of ISS Africa, and Gilles Yabi of WATHI all argue that weak governance, poor local service delivery, and climate-related resource pressures require long-term reforms alongside emergency response.

They note that without stricter rule of law, functioning local administrations, and climate-resilient land and water management systems, border communities will remain vulnerable to both violence and displacement.

Together, these institutional and expert assessments form the basis of the policy roadmap, making it clear that the recommendations are grounded in regional analysis, not subjective commentary.

At the Core: A Governance Failure

At its heart, this crisis is not just about war; it is about state collapse and institutional weakness. In Mali, years of shrinking government presence in rural areas have created vast ungoverned spaces where civilians have no access to security, justice, or basic services. This vacuum has allowed jihadist groups and irregular forces to dictate daily life.

One example is the closure of dozens of rural courts and administrative posts in Mopti and Ségou, which left communities unable to report crimes or seek legal protection. As a result, many villagers fled simply because there was no functioning authority to intervene when armed groups entered their areas.

Another is the withdrawal of state security from the Ménaka region in 2023–2024, which enabled militant factions to overrun entire communes without resistance.

Local leaders and humanitarian agencies repeatedly warned that the absence of state forces, combined with delayed responses from Bamako, accelerated the collapse of community safety and forced mass flight.

A third example sits on the Côte d’Ivoire side of the border: limited administrative capacity in towns like Tengrela, Doropo, and Bouna, where local officials must manage rapid refugee arrivals with minimal staffing, inadequate screening infrastructure, and overstretched health and education systems.

This under-investment means that even when Côte d’Ivoire is willing to provide protection, the institutions responsible for delivering services are not equipped for the scale of displacement.

These failures from Mali’s retreating state presence to Côte d’Ivoire’s strained border governance show how fragility in one country quickly spills into another.

Without stronger institutions capable of protecting civilians, resolving disputes, and supporting border communities, displacement becomes the only option for

A Future Unknown

For now, Côte d’Ivoire stands watchful, reinforcing borders, coordinating aid, and weighing the regional implications of rising instability.

But as policymakers debate security frameworks and long-term strategies, refugees like Awa face a simpler truth: survival comes before politics.

Holding her two children tightly, she whispers:

“When they shot at us, we ran. All we want is safety. Just safety.”