At dusk in a small village outside Mocímboa da Praia, northern Mozambique, the hum came again, a faint mechanical buzz, like a mosquito trapped in a bottle. Villagers looked up instinctively. They’d learned to fear that sound.

Within minutes, government troops stationed nearby began to scatter, scanning the horizon. “Sometimes it’s just a drone. Sometimes it’s followed by gunfire,” says Manuel Tchamba, a fisherman who fled the coastal community last year. “You don’t wait to find out which one.”

That night, militants from the Islamic State’s Central Africa Province (ISCAP) attacked from three directions, burning homes and stealing food. Days later, soldiers confirmed what residents already knew: the attackers had used a small quadcopter for reconnaissance, guiding fighters toward troop positions and escape routes.

Across Africa, such stories are multiplying. From northern Nigeria’s forests to Somalia’s borderlands and the Sahel’s vast deserts, the same hobby drones used for weddings, farming, and film-making are now being weaponised, and the sky is turned into a new theatre of war.

Insights on Drone Proliferation and Use In Africa

A growing body of research paints a stark picture of how drones are reshaping conflicts across Africa. According to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, at least 900 drone strikes have occurred in 15 African countries since 2011, resulting in more than 3,000 fatalities, illustrating the scale and lethality of state-operated UAVs in the continent’s conflicts. Beyond state actors, non-state armed groups are increasingly operationalizing drones. A UNIDIR report tracking incidents from January 2018 to June 2023 found that roughly 53% of recorded drone incidents were attributed to terrorist groups, 12% to rebel groups, with others spread across different actors, highlighting a diverse and growing set of UAV users in Africa.

Third-party verification further underscores the human cost. SIPRI’s 2025 Yearbook confirms armed drone activity in at least six sub-Saharan African conflicts—Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, and Sudan—reporting that over 940 civilians were killed between November 2021 and November 2024. Complementing this, Drone Wars UK documents at least 50 separate drone strike incidents during the same period, killing 943 civilians, highlighting the persistent threat to non-combatants and raising accountability concerns.

In parallel, data on proliferation reveals a rapid expansion of state-owned drone capabilities. The CNAS Drone Proliferation Dataset tracks 633 drone transfers from 1995–2023, noting that 51 of 84 transfers to Africa occurred since 2020, many involving advanced systems such as Bayraktar TB2s. Furthermore, SIPRI and the Africa Center highlight that the military use of drones is reshaping operational dynamics, allowing state actors to extend surveillance and strike reach, while non-state actors increasingly adapt commercial UAVs for offensive operations.

Beyond kinetic impact, drones are also transforming information dynamics. ISS Africa reports that non-state actors leverage drones for propaganda, capturing video and imagery to bolster messaging, morale, and recruitment. Similarly, the UNOCT/CAR Global Report on UAS Use by Non-State Armed Groups emphasizes the strategic and security risks posed when insurgents acquire, weaponize, and deploy drones, a concern with growing resonance in the Sahel and Horn of Africa.

Governance and regulatory gaps exacerbate the threat. The Centre for Africa and Near East Studies (CANES) reports that 31 African states now operate military drones, yet accountability, oversight, and export controls remain inconsistent. The lack of harmonized regulation, coupled with rapid proliferation, underscores the urgent need for policy, regional cooperation, and industry engagement to mitigate civilian risk and prevent drones from becoming a destabilizing force.

These studies collectively provide a rigorous, multi-dimensional picture of drone proliferation and use in Africa, supporting both the statistical claims about strike frequency and casualties, as well as broader discussion of governance, non-state adaptation, and strategic implications for the continent.

The Mechanics of Weaponisation

Weaponising a drone doesn’t require a laboratory — just patience and internet access. Militants strip off cameras, attach crude release mechanisms, and repurpose explosive components from old mortar shells or hand grenades. Tutorials circulate on encrypted messaging platforms, often shared by affiliates linked to the Islamic State’s propaganda arm.

According to a former militant, now in rehabilitation in northeastern Nigeria, who craved anonymity, “We used a fishing line to drop small bombs. You fly, press the camera button, and it releases. I learned it on Telegram. It wasn’t hard.” He continued, ‘before now, we were shown video clips from a popular American series, (The Blacklist) of how criminals delivered arms in pieces to prisoners in a jail, who used them to plan their escape’. Videos like that, he said, boost the terrorists’ morale to adopt technology in their operations, to enable them to adapt to present-day realities.

This do-it-yourself ingenuity has become the signature of modern insurgency that is flexible, fast, and constantly evolving.

Acquisition and Foreign Support

African insurgent groups, including ISWAP, JNIM, and Al-Shabaab, are increasingly harnessing drones for reconnaissance and offensive operations. Their growing capabilities are fuelled by a combination of transnational networks, battlefield experience, and accessible technology.

Transnational Jihadist Networks

Many of these groups maintain ideological and operational links to global jihadist networks, which facilitate the transfer of technical knowledge. Messaging platforms associated with Al-Qaeda and IS are frequently used to share guidance on operating and modifying uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) (European Security & Defence). Social and “dark” networks also allow groups to source and adapt commercial drones for tactical purposes (DefenceWeb; Africa Security Newswire).

Training and Personnel Exchanges

Evidence suggests that knowledge transfer often occurs through the movement of trained personnel. According to a UN Office of Counter-Terrorism/Conflict Armament Research report, non-state actors may receive remote or in-person technical support, adding that key individuals often move to provide hands-on assistance. The Policy Center (Morocco) reports that former fighters from the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) have joined JNIM, bringing drone expertise with them. Notably, Col. Hussein Ghulam, previously with FLA, joined JNIM in mid-2024 and has been linked to the group’s expanding drone capabilities. Al-Shabaab maintains ties with AQAP and the Houthis, both of whom possess advanced drone proficiency, creating corridors for expertise transfer (Lawfare).

Seizures and Battlefield Captures

Insurgents also acquire drones through capturing equipment from state forces or rival groups. In Somalia, Al-Shabaab reportedly seized a U.S.-made ScanEagle drone, using it as a platform to study, replicate, or adapt drone technology (Military Africa).

Open-Source and Commercial Technology

Commercial drones such as DJI models remain a major enabler due to their low cost, widespread availability, and adaptability. Insurgent groups modify these UAVs to carry explosives (Military Africa). Encrypted messaging apps like Telegram are used to share technical guides, software tweaks, and operational tactics (Bloomsbury Intelligence & Security Institute).

Learning from Foreign Conflicts

Some African insurgents adopt tactics from external theatres of conflict. Reports indicate that FPV (first-person view) strike operations, seen in Ukraine, have influenced groups like JNIM, which now employ fiber-optic drones resistant to jamming (Policy Center; Lawfare).

Propaganda and Symbolic Use

Beyond battlefield applications, drones serve as propaganda tools, helping armed groups boost prestige, attract recruits, and demonstrate technological sophistication (ISS Africa; Polity.org.za). The visual impact of drone footage amplifies their perceived power, extending influence in the information domain as well as the physical battlefield.

The diffusion of drone skills through global jihadist networks significantly enhances the lethality and sophistication of non-state actors. Because many systems are commercial and readily adaptable, barriers to acquisition are low, accelerating operational growth. Coupled with propaganda use, drones strengthen both the strategic and psychological power of insurgent groups across Africa.

State Suppliers and Foreign Backers

Several states have directly or indirectly enabled drone capability in Africa. A report by Crisis Group revealed that Turkey exports Bayraktar TB2 drones along with comprehensive training and maintenance packages, allowing recipient forces to rapidly operationalize their systems. These exports have reshaped regional access to advanced UAVs. Similarly, Reuters also reported that Iran has supplied components, expertise, and training to the Houthis, transforming their drone and missile capabilities. Seized shipments provide tangible evidence of these transfers. Also, Russia and Russian private military actors, including Wagner-linked deployments, have, according to a report by Reuters, provided training and technical support in Libya and the Sahel, enhancing local UAV operations.

Transfers Enabling Insurgents

A UNIDIR Insurgents often gain access through captured drones or diverted systems, turning battlefield captures into learning platforms for reverse engineering. Black-market brokers and smuggling networks also supply dual-use components, as seen in the Houthis’ supply chain.

Online Platforms and Open-Source Learning

Encrypted messaging channels such as Telegram facilitate the sharing of tutorials, tactics, and technical guidance (Combating Terrorism Center at West Point). Public forums, YouTube, and GitHub provide commercial build guides, firmware modifications, and schematics, lowering the technical barrier for non-state actors.

Transnational Networks and Personnel Movement

Insurgents benefit from operational mentorship and personnel exchange through ideological networks tied to Al-Qaeda, IS affiliates, and regional proxies (UNIDIR). State-to-non-state linkages—like Iran’s indirect support to Houthis—further enhance expertise transfer. These networks and mechanisms demonstrate that African insurgent groups are not simply improvising with drones—they are systematically acquiring skills, sourcing materials, and adopting best practices from global conflicts. This has accelerated their operational sophistication, increased the lethality of drone-enabled attacks, and extended their influence beyond the battlefield into information and psychological domains.

Implications for Military Security

The rise of hobby and commercial-grade drones in African conflict zones is reshaping the continent’s security landscape in ways that militaries can no longer ignore. Once dismissed as toys, these small quadcopters and FPV platforms now give insurgent groups capabilities that traditionally required state-level resources. As DefenceWeb notes, “small, commercial drones may facilitate the weaponization of small, tactical drones by militant groups,” with groups such as JNIM already using FPV drones to drop IEDs in the Sahel. Their affordability, accessibility, and ease of modification mean non-state actors can deploy them for reconnaissance, targeting, psychological warfare, and precision strikes at a fraction of the cost of conventional weapons.

For militaries, this creates a new asymmetry: a $300 device can now spot troop movement, guide ambushes, or deliver improvised explosive charges with alarming accuracy. According to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, the spread of commercial drones is “denying state security forces the monopoly on aerial surveillance and strike capabilities.” The result is a shrinking tactical advantage for state forces, who must suddenly defend against swarms, low-flying craft, and improvised kamikaze drones that traditional air-defense systems were never designed to intercept.

ISS Africa reports that in parts of the Sahel, “commercially available small civilian drones” have already been converted into “armed suicide or kamikaze drones,” posing major risks in regions like the Sahel, Somalia, and northern Nigeria, where forces are overstretched across vast terrain.

The intelligence picture is also shifting. Hobby drones allow insurgents to conduct persistent surveillance over military bases and patrol routes, exposing gaps in perimeter security. ISS Africa highlights that these cheap drones not only gather intelligence but also “provoke fear and disrupt military routines.” Groups like ISWAP, Al-Shabaab, and JNIM now integrate drone footage directly into operational planning. SentryCS reports that ISWAP has used drones to coordinate ambushes and, in December 2024, deployed “grenade-strapped drones” in attacks on army positions. Meanwhile, the Military. Africa notes that JNIM is adopting “small agile platforms for precise targeting,” including FPV drones for IED delivery. Lawfare further observes that JNIM uses modified DJI Mavic and Matrice drones, and even fiber-optic-controlled variants less vulnerable to jamming.

Another concern is how drones weaken the anonymity of the battlespace. In conflicts where militias blend into civilian populations, hobby drones allow militants to conduct safe stand-off operations: mapping checkpoints, tracking patrols, and escaping before detection. GNET Research documents how JNIM has used FPV drones in Burkina Faso “to drop plastic-bottle IEDs” on military positions, demonstrating how low-cost drones allow insurgents to strike without exposing fighters directly. This complicates counterinsurgency and forces militaries to rethink perimeter defense, patrol patterns, and base layouts.

Moreover, the widespread availability of off-the-shelf drones accelerates tactical learning among insurgent groups. With open-source tutorials, encrypted messaging channels, and global battlefield footage, especially from Ukraine, armed groups can rapidly adopt new techniques such as FPV kamikaze strikes and modified grenade-drop systems. WestAfricaMaps notes that terrorist groups in the region are increasingly using FPV drones for reconnaissance and “precision strikes previously reserved for state militaries.” This constant innovation cycle means African militaries face adversaries that evolve far faster than their procurement processes and doctrinal adjustments.

In effect, the proliferation of hobby drones is democratizing battlefield technology across Africa—flattening the power hierarchy between state and non-state actors and ushering in a new era of low-cost, high-impact aerial threats that militaries must urgently adapt to counter.

Interference with Air Traffic

While specific incidents involving collisions with commercial aircraft in Africa are rare, there have been near-misses and operational disruptions that have prompted serious regulatory action:

•        Airport Disruptions: Concerns over unauthorized drone operations near airports have led to temporary halts of air traffic in various African countries. For instance, the Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA) issued a regulation on drone operation to prevent “incursion and risk to flight operations” after acknowledging the threat posed by the increasing use of drones in the country’s airspace.

•        Regulatory Responses: Authorities, like the Tanzania Civil Aviation Authority (TCAA), have put in place strict regulations, such as prohibiting drone flights within a certain radius of airports, specifically to prevent potential collisions, acknowledging that such incidents have occurred in other parts of the world.

The use of drones in Africa is generally regulated by civil aviation laws, with different countries taking varying approaches in the regulation of the acquisition and use of drones. In addition to highlighting the privacy needs of citizens, governments have also cited the need to protect national security. However, these laws can be restrictive and have already resulted in journalists’ arrests in several African countries.

Counter-Drone Industry and Technology

As drones increasingly appear in African conflict zones, governments face an urgent need to develop coordinated governance frameworks and counter-drone strategies. Experts note that without robust regulation, insurgents can exploit commercial systems, online tutorials, and captured military drones to devastating effect.

A foundational step is establishing national drone regulatory frameworks. Clear licensing and operator registration, import controls for high-end commercial drones, and mandatory reporting of lost or stolen UAVs would help prevent diversion to non-state actors. Tiered regulations distinguishing recreational, commercial, and military UAVs can provide clarity for law enforcement while ensuring legitimate drone use continues to flourish.

Equally important are border and supply-chain controls. Insurgents often acquire components such as batteries, flight controllers, and antennas through legal commercial channels or illicit imports. Screening shipments, monitoring high-risk corridors, and coordinating with manufacturers to flag suspicious bulk orders can dramatically reduce the flow of equipment into insurgent hands.

On the tactical side, African militaries and police can adopt layered counter-UAS architectures, modelled on lessons from Ukraine, Iraq, and Yemen. Low-cost acoustic and radio-frequency detectors, AI-assisted thermal identification, and short-range neutralization tools such as jammers, nets, and anti-FPV projectiles can protect both military and civilian areas. Special attention should be given to critical infrastructure — airports, power stations, oil and gas facilities, and military installations — where no-fly zones, perimeter defences, and rapid-response teams are essential.

Training and operational adaptation are also key. Units should be familiar with drone recognition, counter-surveillance tactics, and rapid-response procedures. Lessons from Eastern Europe highlight the value of combining persistent surveillance drones with indirect-fire units, an approach that African forces can adapt to local conditions. In rural and conflict-prone regions, community awareness programs can also serve as an early-warning layer.

Regional coordination is critical. Shared intelligence, cross-border interdiction efforts, and harmonized drone regulations through bodies like the AU, ECOWAS, and IGAD can prevent insurgent safe havens and standardize best practices. Public-private partnerships, leveraging drone manufacturers, telecom operators, and logistics companies, can provide real-time monitoring and reduce the risk of component diversion.

By combining robust governance, tactical countermeasures, intelligence coordination, and community engagement, African states can significantly mitigate the emerging drone threat. The continent now has the opportunity to implement a proactive strategy before these technologies become a permanent advantage for insurgents.

Governance and Regional Policy Responses

The rise of drones in African conflict zones is not just a technological issue—it is a governance and security challenge that spans borders, markets, and communities. Insurgents exploit porous borders, unregulated imports, and limited oversight of civilian airspace to acquire, modify, and deploy drones with increasing sophistication. Addressing these vulnerabilities requires coordinated action by governments, regional bodies, and industry stakeholders.

At the national level, governments must enact comprehensive drone regulations that include operator licensing, mandatory registration, and strict control over the import of high-end UAVs and components. These measures directly address the risks posed by unmonitored imports and stolen or diverted civilian drones. Security forces should adopt layered counter-drone systems, combining acoustic and radio-frequency detection, AI-assisted identification, and neutralization tools such as nets, jammers, or counter-drones. Protecting critical infrastructure and civilian populations requires no-fly zones, perimeter defences, and rapid-response units trained to respond to drone incursions. Complementing these measures with community awareness campaigns and local personnel training ensures early recognition and rapid action against threats.

Regional bodies such as the African Union, ECOWAS, IGAD, and SADC play a key role in harmonizing policy and enhancing cross-border intelligence sharing. Coordinated interdictions, standardized drone regulations, and joint counter-drone exercises can close gaps that insurgents exploit, preventing the free movement of drone components and operational know-how across national borders.

Industry stakeholders—including drone manufacturers, telecom operators, and logistics firms—can also help reduce the threat. By monitoring bulk sales, implementing geofencing in sensitive areas, and flagging suspicious transactions, private actors can work hand-in-hand with authorities to prevent drones from falling into the wrong hands, without restricting legitimate commercial or recreational use.

Ultimately, linking governance, regional coordination, and industry collaboration addresses the very threats that have enabled insurgent drone operations. By acting proactively, African governments can ensure drones are used for progress and safety, rather than as instruments of violence, while staying ahead of a rapidly evolving technological challenge.

Lessons From the Middle East and Eastern Europe

While Africa increasingly absorbs drone-warfare tactics from conflicts abroad, the Middle East and Eastern Europe also offer valuable lessons on how to curb the illegal use of hobby, commercial, and improvised drones by non-state armed groups. Countries grappling with ISIS, the Houthis, and the Russia–Ukraine war have developed some of the world’s most adaptive counter-drone practices—many of which can be localised for African security environments.

1. Rapid Detection and Monitoring Systems Are Essential

Counter-ISIS operations in Iraq and Syria highlighted the importance of early drone detection, even for small quadcopters. Coalition forces deployed layered sensors—acoustic arrays, compact radars, RF scanners, and thermal imaging—to identify drones before they reached their targets.

Ukraine has expanded this concept dramatically, fielding low-cost radar stations, anti-FPV cameras, and community-based observation networks that alert military units when hostile drones are airborne. African militaries can adopt low-cost, layered detection systems that combine commercial radars, radio-frequency detectors, and trained community early-warning teams capable of identifying drone launches near villages, forests, and border corridors.

2. Jamming and Electronic Warfare Work Best When Decentralised

In Mosul and Raqqa, U.S.-led forces found that centralised jamming systems were too limited to counter multiple small drones. The shift to portable, decentralised EW tools—handheld disruptors, backpack jammers, and vehicle-mounted RF guns—proved far more effective against ISIS’s drone fleet.

Ukraine refined this approach: every company-level unit now deploys its own lightweight anti-FPV jammer, creating a dense “bubble” of electronic protection. Africa should build distributed jamming capacity, allowing platoons, checkpoints, and forward-operating bases to defend themselves without waiting for high-end strategic systems that are too few and too far away.

3. Hardening Military Bases Against Drone Surveillance and Attacks

The Houthis forced Saudi and Emirati forces to rethink base security by launching standoff drone strikes against airports, fuel depots, and command centres. In response, Gulf states reinforced facilities with:

• blast-resistant roofing
• anti-drone mesh netting
• sand-filled barriers
• overhead camouflage
• underground storage for vehicles and munitions

Ukraine has gone further by redesigning trenches, OPs, and artillery positions to reduce visibility to FPV drones—often using cheap materials such as wooden beams, camouflage sheets, and metal grids. Africa should reinforce bases and outposts using low-cost structural defenses—netting, screens, overhead covers, concealed troop movement routes, and fortified dugouts—to reduce the success rate of reconnaissance and kamikaze drones.

4. Targeting Supply Chains and Logistics Works Better Than Chasing Individual Drones

The Middle East has shown that drones are just the end product of a larger supply chain. Iran’s support to the Houthis, for example, relied on smuggling digital components, training manuals, and GPS modules via maritime routes and covert land corridors.

Ukraine learned to counter Russia’s drone supply chain by:

• targeting warehouses
• seizing parts shipments
• cutting access to electronics
• striking drone-production workshops

Authorities must therefore focus on border controls, parts tracking, and restrictions on dual-use electronics—such as flight controllers, FPV goggles, and long-range antennas—rather than reacting only after drones appear in the sky.

The strategies used to counter ISIS’s drone experiments, the Houthis’ long-range strikes, and Russia’s FPV saturation tactics point to a single conclusion: Africa does not need to reinvent the wheel. The tools, doctrines, and structural fixes already exist—tested on some of the world’s most drone-saturated battlefields.

For African governments facing rising drone-enabled insurgencies, the path forward is clear:

• Detect early.
• Disrupt consistently.
• Harden facilities.
• Control the supply chain.
• Regulate civilian drones.
• Train every soldier for a drone-threat environment.

Adapting these lessons to African contexts can help close the capability gap—before insurgent drone warfare evolves even further.

Charting a Path Forward: Clear Recommendations for Africa

To effectively mitigate the growing drone threat in African conflict zones, governments, regional bodies, and industry stakeholders must act decisively. The solutions require a coordinated approach that links governance, operational readiness, and technology controls to the specific vulnerability insurgents exploit.

First, African states must establish comprehensive drone laws that address licensing, registration, and controlled import of UAVs. Porous borders and unregulated imports have allowed insurgents to acquire drone components with minimal oversight.

Secondly, Organizations such as the African Union (AU), ECOWAS, IGAD, and SADC must facilitate cross-border intelligence sharing on drone incidents and component smuggling. Harmonized drone regulations across neighboring states can close loopholes that insurgents exploit to move components freely across borders.

Thirdly, drone manufacturers, telecom operators, and logistics companies play a critical role in preventing misuse of UAV technology. By monitoring bulk sales, implementing geo-fencing in high-risk areas, and alerting authorities to suspicious purchases, the industry can reduce the flow of drones and components into insurgent hands.

Linking Proposals to Threats

• Porous borders and illicit imports: Targeted customs inspections, regional intelligence sharing, and manufacturer cooperation can prevent drone components from reaching insurgents.
• Civilian safety and critical infrastructure vulnerability: Counter-UAS deployment, no-fly zones, and rapid-response units protect both urban and rural populations.
• Rapid insurgent adaptation and knowledge transfer: Training programs, community awareness campaigns, and continuous monitoring of extremist online networks ensure security forces can anticipate and counter emerging tactics.

By integrating governance, regional coordination, and industry partnership, African nations can preemptively reduce the operational impact of insurgent drones. Early action ensures that UAVs are tools for development and safety, rather than instruments of violence, and that the continent stays ahead of a rapidly evolving technological threat.