Is there really free lunch in Freetown? This is a million-dollar question begging for answers when it comes to Türkiye’s dealings with Somalia.
Somalia is considered a poor country economically, despite signs of positive growth and development progress. Its GDP was estimated at around $13.5 billion in 2025, with a growth rate of about 3.9%. The economy remains largely informal and heavily reliant on agriculture, remittances from the diaspora, and foreign aid. The country’s per capita income is around $766, reflecting the challenges its population faces in terms of poverty and limited economic opportunities.
Although the country is gradually improving through reforms with better fiscal management and increased domestic revenue mobilisation to reduce dependence on external assistance, key sectors such as agriculture, fisheries, digital technology, and manufacturing are targeted for growth to create jobs and diversify the economy. However, Somalia’s growth remains vulnerable to climate shocks, political instability, insecurity, and aid uncertainty.
The sad reality is that Somalia remains economically poor but shows positive prospects for gradual improvement if stability and development reforms continue effectively.
Somalia is also said to have potential gas reserves of 6 billion cubic metres and over 30 billion barrels of oil. Broader estimates suggest the country holds up to 110 billion barrels in combined offshore and onshore reserves of both oil and gas.
In 2011, Türkiye entered Somalia and began with humanitarian relief that quickly evolved into a long-term strategic partnership. What started as food aid, health missions, and infrastructure rehabilitation expanded into economic investment, political influence, and growing military engagement.
Ankara initially saw Somalia’s failed statehood and the relative absence of other major international actors as an opening to project itself as a rising power in Africa. Its objectives were to: gain international visibility and test its crisis response capacity in fragile states; expand economic frontiers by tapping into East African markets; and promote Islamic solidarity while crafting the image of a benevolent Muslim middle power.
Faith-based NGOs, Turkish Airlines, and other national brands were mobilised to fundraise and implement relief projects. Within a few years, Somalia’s recovery became framed within Türkiye as a national cause.
By 2014, the reopening and management of Mogadishu’s port and airport by Turkish firms boosted Somalia’s economy compared to the previous decade. Turkish leaders showcased these gains as proof of successful state-building, even as Al-Shabaab’s insurgency remained unresolved.
On 8 February 2024, Türkiye and Somalia signed an economic partnership and defence cooperation agreement that drew global attention to the Horn of Africa amid heightened tensions linked to the Gaza war and instability in the Red Sea. While the full details of the framework remain undisclosed, reports indicate that Türkiye will, over the next ten years, train the Somali army and support the creation of a navy, shipyards, and critical infrastructure to safeguard Somalia’s 3,898-kilometre coastline against piracy, smuggling, illegal fishing, and external incursions.
Beyond defence, the pact opens the door to broader projects such as expanding Somalia’s ports and road networks. For Türkiye, it also serves as a springboard to extend its influence in East Africa and the wider Indian Ocean.
Although Sub-Saharan Africa is not a major trading region for Türkiye, its commercial ties with Somalia have grown significantly from just US$2 million in 2003 to nearly US$400 million by 2023.
Turkish investments now total about US$100 million, while humanitarian aid has reached US$1 billion, the largest share of Türkiye’s assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa.
Somalia has already hosted Türkiye’s largest overseas military base, TURKSOM, since 2017. The facility is designed to train 10,000 Somali personnel, underscoring Ankara’s long-term security commitments. Türkiye’s presence in Somalia began in the 1990s as part of a NATO mission but has since taken on a markedly different character.
The defence partnership between Türkiye, a NATO member, and Somalia, one of the world’s poorest nations, is rapidly deepening — raising a central question: who is getting what?
Major Deliveries and Equipment
1. T-129 ATAK Combat Helicopters
In mid-2025, Türkiye delivered three T-129 ATAK helicopters to the Somali Air Force, along with two utility helicopters for the Somali Navy. The aircraft were flown in using six Turkish A400Ms and a Qatari C-17A, coinciding with the completion of Turkish-led training for Somali pilots.
2. Armoured Vehicles – Kirpi (Hedgehog)
Türkiye also supplied Somalia with Kirpi mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles, built by BMC. Already in service with Turkish forces and exported to Libya and Tunisia, the Kirpi carries up to 13 personnel, with V-shaped hull protection against landmines and ballistic shielding to NATO STANAG 4569 Level 3. Powered by a Cummins 375-hp engine, the 19-tonne vehicle reaches speeds of 100 km/h with an 800 km range.
3. Pickups
Twelve Mitsubishi Triton pickups, mounted for machine guns, were handed to the Somali 3rd (Eagle) Infantry Battalion, trained under Turkish supervision.
4. Unmanned Aerial Systems (Drones)
Bayraktar TB2 drones previously operated by Türkiye in Somalia have been supplemented by reports of Akinci drones being deployed.
5. Intercepted Shipments
In July 2025, Puntland authorities seized a Turkish-marked cargo vessel, Sea World, carrying armoured vehicles, anti-aircraft guns, and ammunition reportedly destined for Mogadishu. The cargo was later handed over to Ankara.
About 500 Turkish soldiers are currently stationed in Somalia, including 300 commandos safeguarding facilities, training Somali troops, and overseeing drone operations. Türkiye’s Ambassador to Mogadishu, Mehmet Yilmaz, said Ankara aims to train up to one-third of Somalia’s military, around 15,000–16,000 personnel.
The “Gorgor” Special Forces and naval units form the backbone of this training effort, both at Camp TURKSOM and in Türkiye.
A 10-year defence cooperation pact underpins these deliveries, aimed at enhancing Somalia’s maritime and counterterrorism capabilities.
A 2024 Defence and Economic MoU granted Türkiye the right to reconstruct, equip, and train Somalia’s Navy and Coast Guard, in exchange for 30% of revenue from Somalia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
In July 2025, both countries signed an amendment protocol at the 17th International Defence Industry Fair (IDEF 2025) in Istanbul, formalising ongoing cash assistance to Somalia’s defence sector.
Somalia’s government, preparing for 2026 elections, insists the pact is defensive. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud said it focuses on “maritime defence and economy” and is not aimed at provoking other nations.
President Erdoğan reaffirmed Türkiye’s commitment to Somalia in 2024, pledging expanded support against Al-Shabaab.
Relations between Türkiye and Somalia grew significantly after Erdoğan’s historic 2011 visit, the first by a non-African leader in two decades. Beyond defence, Türkiye has provided humanitarian aid, scholarships, schools, hospitals, and infrastructure in Somalia.
For President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, TURKSOM also carries symbolic weight, reflecting his emphasis on Islamic solidarity with Muslim-majority African states. The latest agreement further aligns with Erdoğan’s criticism of the Western-dominated liberal order and his oft-repeated phrase: “The world is bigger than five.”
Türkiye–Somalia 2024 Defence and Energy Pacts: A Modern Scramble for Africa
In February 2024, after a Cabinet meeting in Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu, the government approved a defence and economic pact with Türkiye. Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre described the agreement as “historic,” saying it shows that “Somalia is not a nation without brothers.”
Somali Information Minister Daud Aweis posted on X that the 10-year pact would “significantly boost the Somali government’s endeavours to safeguard its sovereignty.”
Earlier that month, Somali Defence Minister Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur and Turkish National Defence Minister Yasar Guler had signed the agreement.
Guler described Somalia as “an important partner of Türkiye in Africa,” adding that the discussions “further strengthened our relations and reaffirmed the importance we attach to Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
The pact is seen as Türkiye’s critical contribution to enhancing peace and security in Somalia and the Horn of Africa.
The announcement came amid escalating tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia, following Addis Ababa’s Red Sea access deal with Somaliland, an agreement Mogadishu denounced as “illegitimate.”
An additional factor behind Türkiye’s deepened cooperation was Ethiopia’s controversial January 2024 memorandum of understanding with Somaliland, under which Addis Ababa agreed to recognise Somaliland’s autonomy in exchange for access to a naval base and commercial port rights at Berbera.
Mogadishu viewed the deal as a violation of Somalia’s territorial integrity. In response, it sought stronger allies to counter Ethiopia’s perceived encroachment. Ankara, already a key security and development partner, moved swiftly to fast-track both the February 2024 defence pact and the March 2024 energy deal.
Analysts note that the Ethiopia–Somaliland arrangement effectively reinforced the logic of a Türkiye–Somalia alliance: Ankara could project stability in the Horn while safeguarding its own strategic and economic interests in the Red Sea corridor.
Rare Earth Minerals and Resource Exchange
On March 7, 2024, according to Reuters, Türkiye signed an offshore oil and natural gas cooperation deal with Somalia, further strengthening bilateral ties after the defence pact.
The Turkish Energy Ministry described it as an intergovernmental agreement covering exploration, evaluation, development, and production of oil in Somalia’s land and sea blocks.
“With this agreement, we will carry out joint activities to bring the resources of Somalia to the Somali people. We aim to strengthen Türkiye’s presence in the Horn of Africa with new collaborations in the field of energy,” Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar said on X.
He later added, “Oil and natural gas exploration offshore of Somalia, likely oil for now, will likely start very soon in the areas we have identified. We may send our seismic exploration vessel there in the first phase.”
The deal also covers transportation, distribution, refining, and sales operations for oil and related products.
Bayraktar noted that Türkiye is pursuing similar ventures elsewhere, including Libya.
The “modern scramble for Africa” refers to the 21st-century competition among global and emerging powers for influence, resources, and strategic access across the continent.
Unlike the 19th-century colonial partition, today’s race is driven by economic diplomacy, defence partnerships, and infrastructure-for-resources deals. Developed nations and assertive middle powers alike are vying for Africa’s critical minerals, energy reserves, maritime routes, and geopolitical alignment in a multipolar world.
The modern scramble is not fought with armies but with contracts, investments, and bases. Developed nations compete to lock in supply chains for critical minerals, secure energy routes, and build alliances in the Global South.
The Türkiye–Somalia partnership embodies this dynamic. Ankara’s 2024 defence and economic cooperation framework goes beyond traditional aid, granting Türkiye a long-term security presence in Somali waters and potential access to untapped hydrocarbon and mineral resources. In exchange, Somalia gains naval protection, military training, and investment from a technologically advanced NATO member.
This “security-for-resources” arrangement mirrors broader global patterns: China’s Belt and Road projects, the Russian security footprint in the Sahel, and Gulf states’ port leases along the Red Sea.
Comparative Models
- China – Infrastructure-for-Resources Strategy
Through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has financed railways, ports, and highways in over 40 African countries, often in exchange for access to minerals, oil, and rare earth elements. - United States – Security and Strategic Access
The U.S. maintains military installations & bases in Djibouti, and Kenya under counterterrorism frameworks, ensuring strategic presence in the Sahel and Horn. Initiatives like Power Africa and Prosper Africa balance Chinese influence while securing stakes in energy and digital infrastructure. - European Union – Energy Transition and Migration Deals
The EU, particularly Germany and France, invests heavily in Africa’s renewable energy and green hydrogen sectors to secure critical minerals for Europe’s clean energy transition. It has also struck migration control deals with Libya, Tunisia, and Niger, using aid as leverage. - Gulf States – Ports and Agriculture
The UAE and Saudi Arabia have leased or built ports across the Red Sea and Horn Berbera, Bosaso, Assab, to control trade routes and food chains, often linking economic projects with military presence. - Russia – Security-for-Minerals Model
Through private contractors like Wagner (now Africa Corps), Russia exchanges military protection for gold, diamond, and uranium rights in Mali, Sudan, and the Central African Republic, trading security for influence. - Türkiye – Strategic Partner and Emerging Competitor
Though not a Western “developed” power, Türkiye has become a rising regional actor blending humanitarian aid, military training, and infrastructure investment. It’s 2024, Somalia pacts signal a bid to combine security presence with economic concessions, echoing both Western and Chinese models.
Somali Reactions and Criticism
Despite government optimism, many Somalis have voiced concern over the transparency and fairness of the oil deal.
According to Garowe Online, critics claim the contract was concluded “in the most opaque manner,” allowing Türkiye to recoup 90% of operational costs before Somalia earns profit, while Somalia receives just 5% in royalties. Parliament, they noted, was not briefed before the signing.
In the Africa Report, Somali engineer and adviser Abduqadir Yusuf called the deal “the worst ever signed by a sovereign nation,” arguing that it strips Somalia of economic rights and sovereignty. He noted the absence of signing bonuses, fee exemptions for Turkish firms, and dispute mechanisms favouring Istanbul.
Civil society activists interviewed by Hiiraan Online said that while Türkiye remains a valued partner, “no foreign ally should control our seas or resources without public scrutiny.” They warned that secrecy could entrench elite dependency, enabling ruling networks to trade national wealth for short-term political gains.
Without transparency and parliamentary oversight, observers warn, such partnerships risk reproducing historical imbalances that have long undermined Africa’s governance and resource management.
Analysts believe that the Türkiye–Somalia case illustrates how modern great power rivalry can blur the line between partnership and patronage, revealing the vulnerabilities faced by developing nations in today’s global scramble for resources.
Not everyone agrees that Türkiye’s cooperation with Somalia is part of its Blue Homeland doctrine. Cem Gürdeniz, the concept’s originator, argues instead that this move distracts from Türkiye’s main strategic focus, the Mediterranean. He warns that “maintaining naval power in Somalia under today’s economic constraints would be a huge burden for our navy.”
With all this analysis, the question now is: who benefits more from this unbalanced relationship?
The truth is that the Türkiye–Somalia partnership is far from equal. Türkiye comes with financial resources, military know-how, and global diplomatic reach; Somalia, by contrast, is fragile, aid-dependent, and locked in an endless war with Al-Shabaab.
For Türkiye, the gains are clearer: a strategic military foothold in the Horn of Africa overlooking the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden; political capital as a reliable NATO ally and emerging security provider in Africa; economic opportunities from port management to construction and energy; and soft power dividends, enhancing its image as a benevolent Muslim power.
For Somalia, the benefits are significant but more precarious. These include military training and equipment to bolster its weak security forces, infrastructure development, access to international markets, and diplomatic visibility with Türkiye lobbying for its reintegration into global politics.
But the risks are high. Somalia’s reliance on Ankara creates a dependency relationship. With little leverage, Mogadishu may find itself “paying back” in the only currency it has: strategic concessions. These could include granting exclusive access to ports, airports, and natural resources; aligning foreign policy more closely with Türkiye’s geopolitical agenda; and allowing Turkish troops and bases a long-term presence on Somali soil.
The fundamental question, then, is whether Somalia can convert this external support into sustainable sovereignty or whether it risks trading off chunks of its autonomy in return for security and survival.
In the end, Türkiye’s hand in Somalia may look like a good lifeline, but it is also a lever. The more the Turkish government invests, the harder it becomes for Somalia to say no. The real test for Somalia will not be whether Turkish aid builds roads or trains soldiers, but whether the country can turn this unequal partnership into a step toward independence or whether it will quietly surrender slices of its sovereignty in exchange for survival.
