As Somalia continues to grapple with political instability despite global intervention, the dynamics are shifting beneath their feet as key players on the UN Security Council express frustration with the pace of peacekeeping progress. The US expressed its their intention to withdraw its backing the operation, citing a bleak future despite billions of dollars being spent in an attempt to restore democratic governance in Somalia.

The African Union (AU) Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), which was constituted under the United Nations Security Council, has relied on overseas funding to meet operational needs such as food, medical supplies, and transportation. The US stance to withdraw support for the operations, as relayed by Washington in July 2026, means AUSSOM will no longer have the financial capability to run its peacekeeping operations. The bold decision, according to Washington, was informed by the belief that such funds should be directed towards other global security concerns as AUSSOM continues to post underwhelming results.

After an outcry by other member states and the fear that Somalia would fall under total control of Al-Shabaab, the US decision to withdraw support prompted a review. has since granted a 12-month review window after which its involvement with AUSSOM is not guaranteed.

The 12-month window, which begins in January 2027, some hope for Somalian ambitions to establish self-governance and eradicate terrorist extremism in the country by the end of 2029. The diplomatic note issued by the US grants its support to the mission until December 2027, a period during which it will still fund the basic amenities for troops stationed in the Horn of Africa.

Since the AUSSOM succeeded the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) in January 2025, the US has supported the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) with a reported 2 billion dollars meant specifically to offset logistics costs. That followed a prior decision by Washington to ditch its traditional mandate of contributing 25% of the UN’s total funding. By working directly with UNSOS, the US has helped sustain the troops through food supply, medical supply, transport costs, and much more. All these important needs are met until the expiration of the 2027 ultimatum.

The Stance of the United States

Despite acknowledging Somalia’s strategic position and its influence on global trade through the Indian Ocean, the US has considered halting all the support it had previously given to UNSOS. The US initially outright rejected a proposal by the UN Security Council to cover up to 75% of AUSSOM operational costs. The frustration comes underwhelming results in progress towards achieving stability.

Washington feels that the local leaders of the state have not helped their case, allowing infiltration by the terrorist groups to render the whole mission a quicksand for funds. If the United States, the UNSOS, which is the central logistics office for AUSSOM, would be deprived of important financial backing and logistical authorisation. Troops would struggle without food, medical supplies, fuel, and transportation. All the effort that has been put into Somalia.

With the 12-month extension, the UN hopes to make a significant stride in stabilising Somalia.

The AUSSOM is also benefiting from a fragile funding system that relies on generous contributions from global institutions and bilateral grants. The UN has, taken the leading role in funding the mission with an initial proposal to fund up to 75% of the operational costs, which was vetoed by the US. The European Union has also played a major part by covering troop allowances and stipends from time to time.

The EU has reportedly injected 75 million Euros in funding linked to other AUSSOM operations. It is also important to highlight the funding from individual states channelled through the AUSSOM Trust Fund managed exclusively by the UN. Despite such hybrid funding models, the operation still heavily relies on the UN for logistics and operations.

The dependence on the UN for logistics is the AU alone does not have the resources and infrastructure to keep 12,000 soldiers safely in highly volatile frontlines. The region requires high-end technological means to ensure roads are kept clear of Improvised Explosive Devices planted by the terrorist groups.

The UN also prefers to keep a close eye on the funding of AUSSOM to avert the risk of infiltration. Controlling logistics gives them full control of the operational activities of the troops. Amani Africa reports that troops require approximately $15 million per month across the entire mission. The cost of keeping soldiers deployed is a financial burden that requires the intervention of the UN.

AUSSOM is operating under a strict ceiling of no more than 12,000 soldiers deployed at any given time. The number is capped so that troop numbers are manageable and fit within the limited budget, as the mission is already struggling with a funding gap.

Reports by AUSSOM.org indicate that the mission currently has a collective total of 11,146 combat soldiers deployed throughout the country. The troops come from different African countries, with the current breakdown showing that Uganda is leading with 4500 troops serving in the mission. Ethiopia has 2500 troops, while Kenya has 1410 troops. While the AU countries provide the necessary manpower to help repel Al-Shabaab and restore stability, the UN, through the UNSOS, provides the logistics and financial backup to make the mission successful.

The Cost of Operation for the AUSSOM

The cost of keeping troops deployed is enormous. The huge financial demand results from recurrent costs such as food, medical support, fuel, and stipends. Troops have also been provided with all necessary weaponry to help repel the armed terrorist groups.

The African Union reports that up to $190 million is spent annually on the mission. This covers the troops’ needs, including basic amenities and stipends. The UN approved a budget of up to $481 million annually for the effective running of the mission, a figure that has proven inadequate considering the demands of the mission.

As it stands, AUSSOM operates under undeniable financial distress, as funds available are insufficient for the operation to run effectively. The funding gap has been noted as a major threat facing the objectives of the initiative. With the US now set to withdraw its support by the end of the year 2027, the funding gap is expected to widen.

The UNSOS, reports that the funding they receive to keep the peace mission going leaves them short by about $78 million and $92 million. That is just over half of what the mission needs annually. The inadequacy of funds cripples the operations even further, creating room for weaknesses that enemy troops can exploit. Even with US, the financial distress is still difficult to ignore.

A sustainable funding model would address the existing gaps in the mission’s operational costs. However, several diplomatic hurdles in the way of formulating a reliable funding model. The US, for instance, has always had a more reserved approach towards approval of the mission’s funding.

Moreover, the key parties involved in the mission have always been locked in a perpetual geopolitical disagreement, making cooperation difficult. The US, the EU, the African Union, and the Somali federal government have often found themselves pulling in different directions on matters directly affecting AUSSOM’s funding.

Upon the inception of the idea that led to AUSSOM succeeding ATMIS, the US expressed their disapproval of the United Nations’ proposal that 75% of the mission’s expenditure be covered directly from the mandatory member dues. The move infuriated other players, including the EU, which has since complained of donor fatigue.

The slow progress and the continuous infiltration by Al-Shabaab militia have also raised major doubts about whether the major funding bodies would be willing to continue funding the mission. The EU has also asked the AU to carry the most weight, as Somalia belongs within the regional organisation. All these unsettled differences have stood in the way of a sustainable, reliable funding model for troops.

AU’s readiness to bridge the gap left by the UN

With the UN’s logistical support now threatened to be halted in a year’s time, the AU and its partners should be working around the clock to fill the gap that the UN is leaving behind. The question, however, is whether the AU and its partners have what it takes to run the logistics and keep the troops deployed without the involvement of the UN.

There is a consensus among those involved that the AU and its international partners do not have the capacity, speed, and infrastructure to run the operations of the mission. Experts now predict that when the UNSOS closes and the funding dries up, the mission has a higher chance of structural collapse. The first challenge they will face is the lack of physical infrastructure. The UN currently provides troops with an estimated 50 bases across the region, all of which will no longer host troops.

The UN has always handled the sustenance of the isolated outposts, ensuring delivery of food, clean water, and medical supplies. Moreover, the tactical air assets provided by the UN have been the only reliable means of ferrying troops to their outposts in a country where roads are Iimprovised explosive devices planted by Al-Shabaab.

Without, troops will be left vulnerable to ambush.exposed to ambush attacks. The AU does not have its own transport aircraft or medical helicopters, making evacuation from isolated positions extremely difficult. This would also severely limit combat operations. With the AU still struggling with integration of its own states and resources, it is extremely unlikely that it can mobilise the required funds quickly enough to close the gap left should the UN leave. That only means one thing. The 12-month extension window will be used to wind down operations, not stage another transition.

Is Somalia’s security sector prepared to take over?

Despite a press statement by Somalia Defence Minister Ahmed Moallim Fiqi expressing confidence in the Somalia National Army (SNA) preparedness to take over security operations in the country post-UN, the data show a totally different picture. Fiqi’s extreme confidence is widely seen as a sideshow to send a message to global donors that Somalia will not be coerced into submission by the threat of funding cuts, and does not represent an accurate picture of the SNA’s preparedness to fight off Al-Shabaab.

Despite notable progress in military organisation, the SNA still lack the basic support, infrastructure, and personnel to succeed AU troops. Previous missions in Somalia have often ended in disappointment once operations are handed over to local forces. Security experts in the region have warned that the confidence expressed by the Defence Minister of Somalia could lead to the country falling apart if rushed to execution.

With the clock ticking for Somalia and the extended window edging closer to the end, the UN, EU, AU, and other players are learning their lessons for future Africa-led peacekeeping missions. The Somalia crisis has shown that the UN’s funding model for peacekeeping missions in Africa is fundamentally broken and needs immediate review. The dynamics between AMISOM, ATMIS, and AUSSOM show that while African countries have the willingness to send troops to support peacekeeping missions, troops will remain dangerously exposed due to unreliable funding strategies.

The UN should review its approach to African peacekeeping missions and establish a steady, reliable funding model that ensures rapid deployment and sustained financial support. Rather than fund three different missions, the UN should rapidly and adequately fund one mission and back it heavily under a short, strict deadline.