\u201cThe future depends on governance,\u201d said Dr. Karim. \u201cIf managed well, gold can build schools, hospitals, and roads. If mismanaged, it will fuel corruption, inequality, and war.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
History offers warnings. Zambia nationalised its copper mines in the 1970s, but poor management and falling prices drove it into debt. Botswana, by contrast, struck a joint venture with De Beers that helped build schools, clinics, and roads\u2014an example of balance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Nigeria\u2019s oil story stands as a cautionary tale. Nationalisation created NNPC, but decades of corruption and inequality left little progress. Tanzania under Magufuli increased revenues through contract renegotiations, but unpredictability scared investors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Mali, Africa\u2019s third-largest gold producer, has moved decisively to reclaim greater control over its mining assets while forging new strategic partnerships that challenge Western dominance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In 2024, Mali\u2019s military-led government took over Barrick Gold\u2019s Loulo-Gounkoto mine, one of West Africa\u2019s most productive gold operations. For years, foreign multinationals had controlled extraction with only modest royalties flowing to Bamako. This was justified as a corrective measure to rebalance ownership in favor of national interests.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Another striking deal was Mali\u2019s $200 million refinery agreement with Russia\u2019s Yadran company, signed in early 2025. The deal gives Mali a 62% ownership stake, with Russia holding the remaining 38%. The refinery, slated to be built near Bamako, is designed to process Malian gold domestically rather than exporting raw ore abroad\u2014a symbolic and material break with the historical pattern of raw resource export dependency.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Such a majority stake is rare in Africa\u2019s extractive sector, where foreign firms typically retain controlling interests. For Bamako, the structure signals a determination to capture greater value at home. Yet the key question remains: will revenues flow into citizen welfare via jobs, subsidies, or infrastructure\u2014or simply reinforce the military government\u2019s patronage networks? Transparency around revenue allocation is still thin.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The refinery, if successfully implemented, could reshape Mali\u2019s fiscal base. Gold currently accounts for over 80% of Mali\u2019s export earnings, estimated at $8\u20139 billion annually. Processing domestically could increase value capture by several percentage points of GDP, potentially boosting government revenues by hundreds of millions of dollars each year.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, history cautions against optimism: the absence of strong oversight institutions often means such revenues are siphoned off by elites. For ordinary Malians, the impact will depend less on ownership percentages than on how proceeds are distributed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Yadran refinery is not just an economic project; it is a geopolitical statement. Mali is signaling that its strategic partners are no longer Paris, London, or Ottawa but Moscow, Ankara, and Beijing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Russia has entrenched itself as Mali\u2019s primary security partner. The Wagner Group (now restructured and operating as \u2018Africa Corps\u2019) has supported Bamako\u2019s counter-insurgency campaigns. The refinery agreement formalizes and expands this relationship into the economic sphere.<\/p>\n\n\n\n T\u00fcrkiye has deepened defense and infrastructure ties, supplying drones and construction expertise. China, though less visible in the gold sector, is acting as a long-term player in infrastructure financing and is quietly exploring Mali\u2019s lithium potential.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Together, these shifts signal Mali\u2019s diversification of alliances and an alternative axis of Russia\u2013T\u00fcrkiye\u2013China cooperation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Although benefits to ordinary citizens remain more aspirational than tangible, the government has promised job creation around the refinery and suggested domestic refining will stabilize fuel prices and allow reinvestment into social programs. Civil society actors, however, warn that without accountability, the refinery risks becoming an elite-controlled venture.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Nevertheless, the symbolism matters. For a country long trapped in unequal mining contracts and external dependence, this new trajectory represents a profound reassertion of sovereignty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The lesson for the Sahel: sovereignty alone is not enough. Balance, transparency, and strong institutions are key.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Nationalisation offers the juntas a chance to reclaim sovereignty and rewrite the story of their resources. But success depends on whether citizens see real benefits in schools, hospitals, roads, rather than soldiers guarding pits.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A smarter path may resemble Botswana\u2019s: keep foreign expertise on fairer terms, share profits, insist on local hiring, protect the environment, and publish contracts so citizens can track revenues.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Sahel also stands on an environmental knife-edge. With climate change worsening desertification, reckless mining could devastate ecosystems and displace farmers. Sustainability is survival.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Nationalisation may restore pride, but without transparency, it risks repeating Zambia\u2019s failures or Nigeria\u2019s oil curse. If the Sahel strikes a balance borrowing from Botswana\u2019s model while avoiding old mistakes, it could turn gold into prosperity rather than conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As one Burkinab\u00e8 miner put it: \u201cGold is a blessing, but also a curse. It depends on who holds the shovel and who shares the profit.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" In the Sahel, sorrow, tears, and pain have indeed become trademarks, as illegal mining fuels insecurity, corruption, and instability. Gold in the Sahel is more than a mineral. It is a political weapon, a lifeline for fragile economies, and a magnet for conflict. Now, it stands at the heart of an audacious experiment in sovereignty […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":13,"featured_media":5020,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"saved_in_kubio":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[19,30,27,25],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5033","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-economy","category-governance","category-infrastructure","category-security"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/openafricantribune.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5033","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/openafricantribune.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/openafricantribune.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/openafricantribune.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/13"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/openafricantribune.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5033"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/openafricantribune.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5033\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/openafricantribune.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/5020"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/openafricantribune.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5033"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/openafricantribune.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5033"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/openafricantribune.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5033"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}![\"\"](\"https:\/\/openafricantribune.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/11\/Ispionline-1024x673.jpg\")
<\/figure>\n\n\n\nMali: A Case Study<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Geopolitics and Strategic Partnerships<\/h3>\n\n\n\n