{"id":8033,"date":"2026-08-25T08:30:00","date_gmt":"2026-08-25T07:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/openafricantribune.com\/?p=8033"},"modified":"2026-08-17T19:31:54","modified_gmt":"2026-08-17T18:31:54","slug":"inside-somalilands-ties-with-israel-amidst-tension-in-somalia","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/openafricantribune.com\/fr\/2026\/08\/25\/inside-somalilands-ties-with-israel-amidst-tension-in-somalia\/","title":{"rendered":"Inside Somaliland\u2019s Ties with Israel Amidst Tension in Somalia"},"content":{"rendered":"

A small, self-declared republic on the northern edge of the Horn of Africa has achieved something it has been striving for over three decades: recognition as a country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Somaliland\u2019s decision to open an embassy in Jerusalem, six months after Israel became the first nation to recognise its independence officially, has transformed a long-standing African border dispute into a regional flashpoint affecting the Red Sea, the Gulf, and the broader Middle East.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For Hargeisa, Somaliland\u2019s capital, this move is a sign of validation after 35 years of diplomatic isolation. For Mogadishu, however, it appears as an act of aggression against a sovereign state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Meanwhile, an increasing number of governments and international groups, including the African Union, China, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, and the Arab League, see it as a dangerous precedent they hadn’t anticipated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Breakaway Republic Born From a Fractured Union<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

To grasp why this is important, it helps to look back at the colonial map. Today\u2019s Somaliland was for decades a separate British protectorate, distinct from the Italian-controlled territory to its south.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

When Britain granted independence on June 26, 1960, Somaliland briefly became an independent state, for just five days, before its leaders chose to merge with the former Italian Somaliland to form the Somali Republic. This union was founded more on romantic notions of Pan-Somali unity than careful planning, and it never truly worked.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The people in the north grew increasingly resentful of being shut out of power in Mogadishu. This grievance boiled over into open resistance during Siad Barre\u2019s dictatorship, when his forces carried out brutal campaigns against the Isaaq clan and other northern communities throughout the 1980s.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

When Barre\u2019s regime finally fell in January 1991, plunging the rest of Somalia into chaos and ongoing civil war, clan elders and community leaders from the north gathered in Burao and did what they had long threatened: they walked away. The Grand Conference of Somaliland Communities declared the return to the old British Somaliland borders and proclaimed the independent Republic of Somaliland that May.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Since then, Somaliland has worked tirelessly to build the institutions of a functioning state, its own currency, police, courts, and a thriving multi-party democracy that has held competitive elections and peaceful transfers of power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These achievements are rare in the region, earning it the reputation of an oasis of stability. Yet, not a single UN member state has recognised its independence. Many legal experts argue Somaliland\u2019s claim to statehood is as strong as that of many countries with seats at the UN.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 2005, the African Union sent a fact-finding mission that tacitly acknowledged this. Still, recognising Somaliland would mean challenging the AU\u2019s core principle of respecting colonial-era borders, and so far, no African government has been willing to take that step.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Why Israel Now<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

That\u2019s what makes Israel\u2019s recent actions so noteworthy. In December, Israel made history by declaring Somaliland an \u201cindependent and sovereign state\u201d not through a United Nations vote or any multilateral process, but via a unilateral declaration.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Six months later, in June, Somaliland\u2019s President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, affectionately known as Cirro, visited Jerusalem, which both sides called the first-ever state visit by a Somaliland leader anywhere.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

President Isaac Herzog welcomed him at the presidential residence, met with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and many of Israel\u2019s security officials, laid a wreath at Theodor Herzl\u2019s grave, and received an award from the Friends of Zion Museum.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

During the visit, Somaliland\u2019s foreign ministry officially opened its embassy in West Jerusalem, with Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar present.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Netanyahu described their relationship in almost sentimental terms, speaking of a shared history of a small nation asking the world for recognition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Abdullahi told Netanyahu that after 35 years of pleading with the world to notice them, Israel was finally the one to listen. Beyond the emotional tones, the visit was clearly strategic: both sides signed a Strategic Cooperation Declaration that Somaliland called the most significant phase yet in their relationship.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The decision to locate the embassy in Jerusalem rather than Tel Aviv, where most foreign missions are typically based, was intentional, given that Jerusalem\u2019s status remains a contentious issue internationally.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Netanyahu greeted the decision with enthusiasm, clearly aiming to send a message: Somaliland was not just establishing diplomatic ties with Israel; it was aligning itself with Israel\u2019s preferred stance on the city\u2019s status.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Unsurprisingly, this move provoked swift condemnation from the Palestinian Authority, the OIC, and the Arab League, adding another layer of complexity to an already tense dispute over Jerusalem amid the ongoing tensions in the Horn of Africa.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

The Red Sea Factor<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Remove the formalities, and it\u2019s clear that the core issue is geography. Somaliland is located along the Gulf of Aden, directly opposite Yemen, right next to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a vital chokepoint for much of the world\u2019s trade between Asia, Europe, and the Middle East.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For Israel, which has spent the past two years exchanging fire with Yemen\u2019s Houthi rebels and frequently facing disruptions to its Red Sea shipping routes, having a friendly presence at the mouth of that strait is a significant advantage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Experts at Chatham House point out that Israel, increasingly isolated after repeated conflicts with Iran and its allies, doesn\u2019t have many natural partners in this region, making Somaliland, eager for recognition but largely overlooked, a surprisingly useful ally.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The most controversial aspect of this situation revolves around Berbera, Somaliland\u2019s biggest port city. Its airport, initially built by the Soviets and later used by NASA as a shuttle-landing site, has reportedly been quietly militarised in recent months. Israel\u2019s defence minister mentioned ongoing behind-the-scenes cooperation that\u2019s now reaching new levels.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In contrast, Somaliland\u2019s defence minister was quoted as saying Israel is training parts of the local military, a claim the government later softened. Somaliland\u2019s president stopped short of confirming plans for an Israeli base outright, but when asked directly, he only said he couldn\u2019t rule it out.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Berbera Factor<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Nothing happens in isolation. Even before Israel became involved, the Emirati logistics giant DP World had already turned Berbera from a neglected harbour into a significant regional port, investing hundreds of millions of dollars over a long-term concession.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The port also serves as a trade route for landlocked Ethiopia. Traffic through Berbera has increased notably in recent years, and discussions are ongoing that could boost volumes further if Ethiopia takes a larger share in the port. The UAE also maintains a military base there, approved by Somaliland\u2019s parliament in 2017.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This existing infrastructure is exactly why Berbera has become so appealing to external powers seeking a strategic position in the Red Sea.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Israel\u2019s recognition of Somaliland is often seen less as a gesture to Somaliland itself and more as a step toward securing future access to the port and nearby airfield. As a regional security expert explained, Israel\u2019s real interest isn\u2019t just Somaliland, it\u2019s the Red Sea itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Somalia\u2019s Anger<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Somalia\u2019s government has not hidden its anger over Israel\u2019s recognition. Officials have described it as a \u201cdeliberate attack\u201d on the country\u2019s sovereignty and warned that it could pull an already fragile region into conflicts that aren\u2019t theirs to fight.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Somalia\u2019s foreign affairs state minister expressed the country\u2019s deepest concern that Somaliland might be dragged into Israeli disputes unrelated to the Horn of Africa, risking even more instability in a region that has already suffered for decades.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Somalia\u2019s president went further, hinting that Israel\u2019s dealings with the breakaway north pose \u201ca very, very big problem,\u201d while emphasising that his government has always rejected Israel\u2019s overtures, especially after Israel\u2019s recognition, which he sees as courting danger.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud said Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had abused Somalia\u2019s sovereignty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cI am encouraging the Somali people to be calm and to defend the unity and the independence of our country, which is facing this naked invasion,\u201d Mohamud said.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mogadishu has repeatedly said it\u2019s open to talks with Hargeisa on any topic except one, that of Somaliland\u2019s independence. That divide has remained unbridgeable for 35 years, and Israel\u2019s recent involvement has only widened the gap.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The African Union Stand<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The opposition of the African Union is a natural consequence of its foundational principles. The bloc has organised its entire post-colonial framework around respecting existing borders, even if they are arbitrary, precisely to prevent a surge of secessionist claims across a continent filled with such movements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Its commission chairperson has cautioned that recognising Somaliland unilaterally could set a precedent with significant, far-reaching consequences, potentially threatening peace and stability beyond the Horn of Africa.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Countries like China, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Qatar have all expressed similar concerns, each for different reasons, ranging from solidarity with Somalia to discomfort with any action that could give Israel a strategic advantage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Interestingly, the UAE, Somaliland\u2019s oldest and most influential outside partner, has been noticeably quiet compared to its Gulf neighbours, opting not to issue a standalone condemnation even as the wider Gulf Cooperation Council has done so.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Could Others Follow Israel\u2019s Lead?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Initially, Somaliland officials hoped that recognition from Israel would set off a chain reaction, with other governments following suit. However, that hasn\u2019t happened. The United States, which has long been Somaliland\u2019s main target for recognition and whose support is most crucial, has maintained its unchanged stance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

No other country has taken action yet. Whether that will change depends heavily on how the security relationship with Israel develops and on whether Washington eventually sees the strategic reasons that draw Israel toward Berbera as relevant to the US too.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Looking ahead, Somaliland faces real opportunities: increased investment, expanded trade routes through Berbera, and a diplomatic opening that might, over time, lead to recognition from other nations. But the risks are just as significant.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Somaliland\u2019s former president publicly demanded that the government reveal the details of any security deals with Israel, warning that the constitution prohibits anything that could be seen as harming fellow Muslims.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Religious scholars in the predominantly Muslim territory remain divided on the issue. Meanwhile, Yemen\u2019s Houthis have labelled any Israeli presence in Somaliland as a legitimate military target. A partnership primarily built around shared enemies carries the danger of inheriting those enemies as well.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Economic Perspective for Hargeisa<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Beyond the headlines about security, Somaliland\u2019s government has tried to present its relationship with Israel in a less dramatic light, focusing on partnerships in water management, healthcare, and agriculture, where Israeli expertise is highly valued in many developing countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This approach matters domestically. Somaliland remains poor by any measure, relying on livestock exports, remittances from its large diaspora, and slowly attracting investments that unrecognised territories usually struggle to get.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Having a functioning port, a stable currency, and three decades without civil war haven\u2019t been enough to bring in the kind of capital that UN-recognised governments typically command.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Officials in Hargeisa hope that Israeli support will help break that deadlock: making it easier to access international financial institutions, improving relations with Washington, and providing a diplomatic advantage that makes future European or Asian governments think twice before dismissing Somaliland.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

There is some reason for cautious optimism, even if it\u2019s limited. The transformation of Berbera under Emirati management has already demonstrated what outside investment can accomplish, improving schools and clinics and boosting the local economy as Ethiopia seeks coastal access that doesn\u2019t go through a rival\u2019s territory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Somaliland hopes Israeli involvement will add a second, more prominent source of investment beyond the Gulf-funded infrastructure. Still, whether Israeli companies and capital will actually come in on a large scale, rather than just through high-profile visits, remains uncertain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A Relationship Neither Side Can Fully Control<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

What makes the Somaliland-Israel connection so volatile is that neither government seems willing to treat it as something that can be contained.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Israel isn\u2019t simply recognising a small African territory out of kindness; it\u2019s trying to gain strategic depth in a stretch of ocean it can no longer afford to ignore, especially now that its options elsewhere in the region have become limited.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Somaliland, for its part, isn\u2019t just accepting recognition; it\u2019s actively seeking a security alliance whose full scope its officials refuse to dismiss, betting that the benefits of finally being acknowledged outweigh the risks of being dragged into conflicts unrelated to Somali politics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

That gamble already faces domestic opposition. A former Somaliland president, generally supportive of the Israel move, has publicly called for transparency about any security deal, warning that using Somaliland as a staging ground against Israel\u2019s enemies would be unconstitutional.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Religious leaders across the territory are divided, some defending the government\u2019s actions, others warning it threatens Somaliland\u2019s standing as a Muslim-majority society.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Meanwhile, the Houthi movement has signalled that any Israeli military presence on Somaliland\u2019s soil would be a legitimate target, turning Berbera from a promising trade hub into a potential frontline overnight.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For Somalia, the danger is of a different kind. Mogadishu\u2019s federal government, already stretched thin by a long-running insurgency and fragile governance, now faces the prospect that a breakaway region it has never controlled could host foreign troops aligned with a country embroiled in active conflicts across the Middle East.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It\u2019s not just a sovereignty dispute on paper; this could evolve into a situation where a distant war spills onto Somali soil without Mogadishu ever having a say.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Six months after Israel\u2019s initial unilateral declaration, the picture emerging is one of two governments moving from symbolic gestures to more concrete actions. At the same time, the rest of the region watches with unease.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Neither the African Union\u2019s condemnation nor Somalia\u2019s diplomatic protests have slowed the rapid pace of engagement between Hargeisa and Jerusalem; if anything, their June state visit suggests both sides are pushing forward rather than stepping back to reassure critics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Whether this marks a turning point in Somaliland\u2019s three-decade quest for recognition, or adds another layer of instability to a territory that has spent 35 years quietly proving it can govern itself, will depend on choices yet to be made in Hargeisa, Jerusalem, Mogadishu, and beyond and on how far Somaliland is willing to go in exchange for finally being acknowledged.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

A small, self-declared republic on the northern edge of the Horn of Africa has achieved something it has been striving for over three decades: recognition as a country. Somaliland\u2019s decision to open an embassy in Jerusalem, six months after Israel became the first nation to recognise its independence officially, has transformed a long-standing African border […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":121,"featured_media":8111,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"saved_in_kubio":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[19,30,25,28],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-8033","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-economy","category-governance","category-security","category-society"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/openafricantribune.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8033","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/openafricantribune.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/openafricantribune.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/openafricantribune.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/121"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/openafricantribune.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=8033"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/openafricantribune.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8033\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":8137,"href":"https:\/\/openafricantribune.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8033\/revisions\/8137"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/openafricantribune.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/8111"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/openafricantribune.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=8033"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/openafricantribune.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=8033"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/openafricantribune.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=8033"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}