{"id":8536,"date":"2026-11-04T11:49:00","date_gmt":"2026-11-04T10:49:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/openafricantribune.com\/?p=8536"},"modified":"2026-10-17T00:49:46","modified_gmt":"2026-10-16T23:49:46","slug":"cameroons-ransom-economy-is-growing","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/openafricantribune.com\/fr\/2026\/11\/04\/cameroons-ransom-economy-is-growing\/","title":{"rendered":"Cameroon\u2019s Ransom Economy Is Growing"},"content":{"rendered":"

Cameroon\u2019s Far North region is facing a growing kidnapping crisis that is displacing civilians, disrupting livelihoods, and exposing communities along the Lake Chad basin to persistent insecurity. In Mayo-Sava, Mayo-Tsanaga, and Logone-et-Chari divisions, armed groups have repeatedly attacked communities, forcing residents to flee their homes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The increase in kidnappings has coincided with military pressure on Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) in neighbouring north-eastern Nigeria. Security experts have linked these operations to the changing security situation across the border, where armed groups operate within a wider network of rural communities and routes connecting Cameroon, Nigeria, and Chad.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Under Operation Hadin Kai, the Nigerian Army reported that its operations in 2025 killed more than 438 Boko Haram and ISWAP fighters, while 881 insurgents and their family members surrendered. In March 2026, the army also reported killing 80 insurgents in Borno State.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, military gains in Nigeria have not ended the threat to civilians across the border. Instead, repeated attacks in Cameroon\u2019s Far North highlight the vulnerability of communities along routes used by armed groups to move across the Lake Chad basin.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

According to the Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS), at least 177 civilians were abducted in Cameroon\u2019s Far North between January and June 2026. Separately, United Nations data cited in reports on the region recorded 308 kidnappings between April and June. The figures differ, highlighting the need for caution when assessing the scale of the crisis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Between 14 and 29 April 2026, attacks in Tagawa, in Mayo-Sava division, displaced hundreds of residents who sought refuge in Zimado, in Logone-et-Chari division.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Beyond displacement, the attacks have disrupted livelihoods through the theft of livestock, food, and other property. This suggests that the threat extends beyond ransom collection to the resources communities depend on for survival.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Who Is Being Targeted and Why?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Kidnapping in Cameroon\u2019s Far North has increasingly become a source of income for armed groups and criminal networks. Their targets include pastoralists, construction workers, teachers, traders, and others believed to have access to money.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On 7 May 2026, Father Valentin Mbaibarem, a clergyman in the region, was abducted alongside five other civilians. The kidnappers demanded 25 million Central African CFA francs (FCFA), equivalent to approximately $42,750, for his release.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

After killing one hostage and releasing others, the kidnappers reportedly maintained their ransom demand for the clergyman.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The incident illustrates how abductors use victims and the financial capacity of their families to generate revenue. However, the risk of abduction is also shaped by geography, limited security presence, and the difficulty of accessing remote communities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Far North has vast rural areas and semi-desert terrain. In villages such as M\u2019pi and Tchakedjou, poor roads and limited security checkpoints can delay the response of security forces, giving armed groups time to escape before troops arrive.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These conditions have also influenced how families respond to kidnappings. Some are reluctant to involve security agencies because they fear their relatives could be harmed if abductors discover that authorities have been contacted. As a result, families may negotiate privately with kidnappers in the hope of securing their relatives\u2019 release.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The redeployment of security personnel and equipment to western Cameroon has also been cited as a possible factor behind the security gaps in the Far North. Observers say the relocation of some US-donated aircraft and vehicles may have weakened the region\u2019s response capacity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Networks Behind the Kidnappings<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Kidnapping operations in the Far North involve more than the armed men who abduct victims. Local criminal gangs and insurgent factions can play different roles in identifying targets, carrying out abductions, and negotiating ransom payments.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Research by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) indicates that local gangs sometimes abduct victims and transfer them to Jama\u2019atu Ahlis-Sunna Lidda\u2019Awati wal-Jihad (JAS), a Boko Haram faction. The insurgents then contact victims\u2019 families to negotiate ransom payments, allowing different participants in the network to benefit financially.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Local accomplices can also provide information about potential targets, terrain, security movements, and vulnerable communities. Such intelligence can help kidnappers identify people who may be able to pay ransom while avoiding security operations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This relationship between local criminal networks and armed groups makes the crisis difficult to address through military action alone. Even when security forces target insurgents, local informants and criminal groups may continue to identify victims and facilitate abductions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

How Ransom Payments Sustain the Conflict<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Ransom payments provide armed groups with money to maintain their operations, purchase weapons, and support fighters. In this system, the payment that secures one victim\u2019s release can also help finance another kidnapping.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A 2025 investigation by Global Voices estimated that armed groups generated approximately $7.884 million in 2023. The figure highlights the potential financial scale of the activities, although it does not establish how much was generated exclusively through kidnappings in the Far North.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Accounts from former fighters and kidnapping survivors also reveal the financial pressures and coercion associated with ransom demands.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Okha Clovis, a former fighter who later entered a disarmament and reintegration programme, said sustaining the conflict in the Far North was expensive. He cited the cost of ammunition and fighters\u2019 drug consumption as reasons armed groups sought large sums from victims\u2019 families.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Clovis said a bullet could cost about $4.10, while fighters could spend more than five million FCFA on drugs in a single day.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In another account, journalist Fred Toh said kidnappers demanded $20,500 for his release, threatening him with death. Varvara Ndjidda also told journalists that his family paid approximately $7,000 before he was released. He said his captors tortured him to pressure his relatives into paying.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These accounts show how violence against hostages becomes a means of extracting money. The threat of further harm places families under intense pressure to raise funds, often leaving them with little time to consider other options.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ransom collection can take several forms. According to accounts from people familiar with the networks, kidnappers or their intermediaries contact families by telephone and arrange payments in cash, through mobile money, or outside formal banking channels.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Cross-Border Trade Under Threat<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The kidnapping economy also threatens the livelihoods of communities that depend on farming, transport, and cross-border trade between Cameroon and Nigeria.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The reopening of the Amchid\u00e9-Banki crossing in 2019 and the Fotokol-Gambaru crossing in 2021 helped restore commercial activity along important routes. Customs revenue in Limani, near the Amchid\u00e9-Banki crossing, reportedly rose from 1.1 billion FCFA to more than 2.2 billion FCFA after the border reopened in 2024. Fotokol generated approximately 1.5 billion FCFA in customs revenue that year.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But the routes that support trade have also become vulnerable to attacks. According to ISS data, at least 29 ambushes occurred between September and November 2024. Traders were targeted, trucks carrying goods were emptied, and drivers and farmers were abducted for ransom.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These attacks disrupt the movement of goods and increase the risks associated with transporting produce to markets. When traders face insecurity, transport delays, or the loss of goods, the costs can be passed on to consumers through higher prices.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The rainy season can worsen the situation, as poor road conditions increase journey times and make some routes more difficult to navigate. Traders who use alternative routes may also face the risk of ambushes in areas occupied by armed groups.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The consequences extend beyond Cameroon. Communities in Nigeria and Chad also depend on the movement of goods across the Lake Chad basin. Disruptions along these routes can affect supplies and commercial activities across the wider region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This leaves authorities facing a difficult balance. Restricting movement or closing crossings for security reasons can undermine livelihoods, while keeping routes open without adequate protection exposes traders and travellers to further attacks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Moving Ransom Money Across Borders<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The movement of ransom payments presents another challenge for authorities. One system used to transfer money across borders is hawala, an informal, trust-based arrangement that allows funds to be paid through agents in different locations without physically moving the money between them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Hawala system remains functional in the Far North, where reports show that the system has become a crucial means of transferring money between Kouss\u00e9ri and Nigeria, partially because of limitations in formal cross-border banking.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Under the system, a sender gives money to an agent in one location. That agent contacts a trusted counterpart elsewhere, who pays the recipient. The two agents settle their accounts separately.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Hawala remains in use in the Far North, including for transfers between Kouss\u00e9ri and Nigeria. Researchers have also identified its potential use by Boko Haram and other criminal networks to move funds across borders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Because the arrangement operates outside conventional banking transfers, tracing the original sender and final recipient can be difficult. This creates challenges for authorities seeking to identify and disrupt the financial channels that facilitate ransom payments.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, the existence of hawala does not mean every transaction through the system is linked to criminal activity. Its role in kidnapping networks must be distinguished from its broader use in communities where access to formal cross-border banking may be limited.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Regional Security Efforts and Their Limitations<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Cameroon and Nigeria have taken steps to improve cooperation against armed groups operating along their shared border.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In June 2026, the two governments signed a memorandum of understanding aimed at strengthening security cooperation through the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). The agreement provides for joint military operations, intelligence sharing, training, and logistical support.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cameroon\u2019s military also reported killing five Boko Haram fighters in February 2026, three in March, and two in July. In the second quarter of 2026, Nigeria\u2019s Operation Hadin Kai reported rescuing 595 abducted civilians, neutralising 484 gunmen, and arresting 370 suspects.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Despite these reported gains, kidnappings have continued. The figures suggest that military operations and hostage rescues have not eliminated the networks responsible for identifying targets, collecting ransom, and moving money across borders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cameroon has also pursued reconstruction and development through its Programme Sp\u00e9cial de Reconstruction et de D\u00e9veloppement de la R\u00e9gion de l\u2019Extr\u00eame-Nord (PSRDREN), a government initiative aimed at rebuilding the Far North. However, recurring attacks continue to threaten communities and undermine these efforts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Disrupting the Financial Networks<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Experts believe that attacking the system that sustains kidnapping could translate to reduced kidnapping rates.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The persistence of kidnapping points to the need to understand how armed groups obtain information, collect ransom, and move the proceeds. Military operations can target fighters, but the wider networks that facilitate abductions may remain active if their financial and logistical links are not disrupted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Research by the Institute for Security Studies indicates that accomplices can identify financially capable targets and provide information about security conditions. This helps explain how kidnappers may continue operating even when military forces launch operations in nearby areas.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The use of informal financial channels adds another layer of complexity. Researchers say reinforced intelligence is perhaps the fastest way to bring kidnapping in The Far North to its barest minimum.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Researchers have also documented the role hawala can play in transferring ransom money, although identifying the specific transactions connected to kidnappings remains a challenge.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For communities in Cameroon\u2019s Far North, the consequences are immediate: families lose relatives, businesses face disruption, and residents are forced to weigh the risks of seeking help against the dangers of negotiating with their captors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As Cameroon and Nigeria continue their joint security efforts, the growth of the ransom economy raises a broader question about how effectively authorities can disrupt the networks that make kidnapping profitable. The continued abduction of civilians despite reported military gains suggests that the challenge extends beyond the battlefield to the local intelligence, criminal relationships, and financial channels that sustain the trade.<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Cameroon\u2019s Far North region is facing a growing kidnapping crisis that is displacing civilians, disrupting livelihoods, and exposing communities along the Lake Chad basin to persistent insecurity. In Mayo-Sava, Mayo-Tsanaga, and Logone-et-Chari divisions, armed groups have repeatedly attacked communities, forcing residents to flee their homes. The increase in kidnappings has coincided with military pressure on […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":120,"featured_media":8669,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"saved_in_kubio":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30,25,28],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-8536","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-governance","category-security","category-society"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/openafricantribune.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8536","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/openafricantribune.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/openafricantribune.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/openafricantribune.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/120"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/openafricantribune.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=8536"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/openafricantribune.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8536\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":8697,"href":"https:\/\/openafricantribune.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8536\/revisions\/8697"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/openafricantribune.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/8669"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/openafricantribune.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=8536"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/openafricantribune.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=8536"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/openafricantribune.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=8536"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}