Relations between Sudan and Ethiopia, two Horn of Africa neighbours, have entered a tense new phase following Sudan’s accusation that drone attacks on Khartoum were launched from Ethiopian territory.
What began as an internal leadership tussle between rival generals of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has slowly and steadily morphed into a direct diplomatic and military clash across Sudan’s borders.
The drone strike in early May 2026, targeting Khartoum International Airport, introduced an unpredictable variable into Sudan’s civil war.
According to Xinhua, in May 2026, Sudan’s Foreign Minister Mohi El-Din Salem said in a statement that the ambassador would be recalled for consultations and that his country is “ready to enter into an open confrontation with Ethiopia.”
“The drones that attacked Sudanese facilities yesterday (Monday) were launched from Ethiopia’s Bahir Dar Airport,” he said.
Sudan has the legal right to respond to the “aggression” in the manner it deems appropriate, he added. “We do not seek to initiate aggression against any country, but whoever attacks us will be responded to.”
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) was also implicated, with Khartoum asserting that Abu Dhabi supplied the drones. Both Ethiopia and the UAE have strongly dismissed the allegations terming them as baseless, politically motivated and part of a deliberate smear campaign.
War back at home
This happens as Sudan’s civil war enters its fourth year. The conflict between the SAF, under General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the RSF, led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), has torn the country apart, creating one of the world’s largest humanitarian crises. Tens of thousands of people have been killed, millions displaced, and large parts of the nation face famine and widespread destruction, according to international estimates.
Reports on the attack against Khartoum International Airport indicated limited physical damage and no confirmed casualties but forced a 72-hour suspension of operations, according to the press office of Sudan’s Ministry of Culture and Information.
The airport had just recently resumed limited international flights after years of disruption. For many Sudanese, that partial reopening was a tiny beacon of hope in a capital damaged by fierce fighting. One moment of progress, shattered overnight.
The facility had been a major battleground since fighting first erupted in April 2023. SAF forces claimed to have pushed the RSF out of much of Khartoum, but the airport strike sent a chilling reminder that no area under government control is indeed secure.
Sudan’s military spokesman, Brigadier General Asim Awad Abdelwahab, was blunt. He told reporters the government had “conclusive evidence” linking the drones to Ethiopia’s Bahir Dar airport in the Amhara region.
“Our armed forces are fully prepared to deal with any threat in a manner that preserves the dignity, sovereignty and security of the nation,” he said, according to Xinhua.
Officials also spoke of at least four similar attacks since early March, including a drone that was shot down in mid-March, whose wreckage and flight data allegedly traced back to the same Ethiopian base and carried connections to UAE-supplied technology.
Foreign Minister Mohieddin Salem framed the incident in emotional terms, calling it a betrayal by a “brotherly state.” He warned that Ethiopia and the UAE had chosen the wrong path and would eventually regret it.
For Khartoum, this wasn’t just another rebel attack, as it represented external forces actively intervening in Sudan’s sovereign affairs.
Evidence, Denials and Lingering Questions
Sudanese authorities cite tracking data, wreckage analysis and flight-path information as the backbone of their case. A drone shot down in mid-March allegedly provided the strongest links to Bahir Dar and Emirati origins. They argue this fits a broader pattern of RSF forces using Ethiopian territory as a safe rear base, especially after losing ground in central Sudan. Yet, as of mid-2026, Sudan has not released the full forensic dossier for independent scrutiny. That gap has fuelled doubt among analysts and diplomats.
While drone launches from Ethiopian territory seem believable, given penetrable borders and reported RSF activity nearby, concrete, publicly verifiable proof of direct state involvement remains limited.
Ethiopia has responded with firm denials. Its foreign ministry highlighted the “historic and enduring bond of friendship” between the two nations while reminding Sudan of alleged violations of Ethiopian sovereignty by Sudanese factions. Addis Ababa called the accusations “baseless” and urged dialogue to resolve Sudan’s internal conflict instead of escalation.
The UAE supported this stance, describing the claims as “fabrications” and “deliberate propaganda” that are aimed at diverting blame, as reported by the BBC. Both countries insist they are not direct players in Sudan’s war.
A Reuters report from February 2026 noted that Ethiopia was allegedly hosting training camps for RSF fighters and had upgraded the Asosa airport for potential drone operations, with UAE backing. Both Addis Ababa and Abu Dhabi denied those claims at the time.
Many observers sense Ethiopia’s genuine frustration at being pulled into Sudan’s mess. With its own post-Tigray recovery still underway and multiple domestic pressures, Addis Ababa insists it wants no part in the conflict. Yet geography and longstanding ties make complete detachment difficult.
How Drones Are Reshaping Sudan’s War
What makes this episode particularly alarming is the larger trend it represents. Drone warfare has quietly become one of the defining features of Sudan’s civil war. Since April 2023, both the SAF and RSF have embraced a wide range of systems from cheap commercial quadcopters and kamikaze drones to more advanced platforms with impressive range. Estimates put the total number of aerial attacks in the hundreds, possibly over a thousand, with civilians frequently paying the heaviest price.
This transformation is part of a wider regional shift in how conflicts are fought. In its March 6 2026 analysis, titled How Drones Are Redefining Conflicts in the Horn of Africa, the Nairobi-based HORN International Institute for Strategic Studies describes drones as having evolved from limited surveillance tools into central instruments of military strategy across the Horn of Africa.
Investigations by organisations, including Amnesty International, have documented advanced foreign-made weapons in RSF possession. Amnesty identified Chinese-made GB50A guided bombs and AH-4 howitzers and said its findings indicated that the weapons were almost certainly re-exported to Sudan by the UAE. Abu Dhabi has rejected allegations that it arms the RSF.
Reports also point to Chinese-made models, such as the FH-95, reaching RSF hands through complex external supply networks. This technological shift has changed the battlefield calculus. Drone swarms, precision hits on airports and power stations and even occasional drone-versus-drone clashes have become more common.
In 2025 and 2026, RSF strikes on Port Sudan and Khartoum aimed squarely at disrupting SAF logistics and governance. The accessibility of drone technology, thanks to commercially available parts and smuggling routes, has helped prolong the stalemate, making outright victory for either side much harder to achieve. The Khartoum airport attack fits this pattern perfectly, as it resulted in relatively low physical damage but had enormous symbolic and psychological impact.
The attack damages the SAF’s claims of control and shatters global confidence in the country’s recovery. But the airport is more than just a military asset; it is a vital hub for moving weapons, delivering humanitarian aid, and rebuilding the nation when the war ends. Disrupting it deepens the humanitarian catastrophe in a war that has already displaced millions and killed tens of thousands.
Old Grudges on the Border
This latest diplomatic blowout did not happen overnight. Sudan and Ethiopia have a long, complicated past full of both partnership and bitter rivalry. The most explosive problem is the al-Fashaga (or Mazega) border area, a highly fertile farming region that both countries claim. Because of colonial-era treaties, a border that was never fully drawn, and competing groups of people living there, this area has been a source of tension for generations.
“Sudanese foreign ministry has summoned the Ethiopian charge d’Affaires in Khartoum today to protest the aggression of the Ethiopian militias that is backed by the Ethiopian army.
The matter led to the killing of several Sudanese military personnel and citizens, including a child,” published Aknara based Anadolu Ajansi.
Back in 2020, while Ethiopia was distracted by the war in Tigray, Sudanese troops moved in to take control of the border area. The move displaced thousands of Ethiopian Amhara farmers and led to deadly clashes.
This border dispute is closely tied to other major problems, including fights over water rights from the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and claims that both countries are hiding each other’s rebel groups. Sudan hosted Tigrayan refugees, while Ethiopia has faced claims of tolerating Sudanese armed actors on its territory. Sudan’s civil war has simply poured gasoline on these long-burning embers.
The UAE’s Shadow Over the Conflict
At the centre of Sudan’s accusations sits the UAE. Khartoum continuously points to Abu Dhabi as the main force funding, arming and supplying the RSF with advanced drones. The UAE denies these claims, calling its role strictly humanitarian and economic. However, multiple UN panels and investigative reports tell a different story, documenting a steady flow of advanced weapons reaching the RSF through Emirati-linked supply chains.
Experts note that the UAE’s stakes in Sudan are incredibly high, ranging from gold mining and farming investments to securing ports on the Red Sea and blocking Islamist political currents allied with the SAF.
Abu Dhabi’s interests in Sudan appear multifaceted, with access to gold trade, agricultural land, Red Sea port opportunities and a broader strategic goal of countering Islamist currents linked to elements within the SAF. These ambitions have put the UAE at odds with other regional players, particularly Egypt, creating a complex proxy dynamic playing out across Sudanese battlefields.
According to Al Jazeera, rights groups, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have accused the UAE of providing arms to the RSF. Several observers argue that Abu Dhabi’s alleged involvement reflects broader ambitions to expand influence across the Red Sea and East Africa, secure access to Sudan’s mineral wealth, particularly gold, and strengthen its regional economic position.
As the International Crisis Group has noted, such external patronage allows both Sudanese factions to believe they can win militarily rather than compromise at the negotiating table.
“The Sudanese civil war is grinding on with no resolution in sight. For nearly three years, two branches of the military, the Sudanese army and paramilitary RSF, have fought bitterly for supremacy. Neither seems on the verge of achieving it. Control of the country is divided between them, and the risk of long-term partition is growing, with both sides naming governments staking claims to nationwide sovereignty in 2025,” noted the International Crisis Group.
Whether Ethiopia’s alleged role reflects direct coordination or simply the spillover effects of porous borders and shared partnerships is still hotly debated. What is undeniable is that Sudan’s war has become a stage for larger regional rivalries.
A Region on the Edge
The diplomatic rupture carries real risks. Trade across the shared border, important for both economies, could suffer. Already, massive refugee flows might intensify. Renewed incidents in al-Fashaga could spiral into direct military confrontation. For the broader Horn of Africa, strained by conflict, climate challenges and economic fragility, this episode tests the mediation capacity of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the African Union and international actors.
Sudan’s civil war is no longer a purely internal affair. It has become a theatre where external powers supply weapons, offer political cover and, according to Khartoum, launch strikes from neighbouring soil. The human cost is catastrophic. Millions have been forced from their homes, famine has taken root in parts of the country, and vital infrastructure lies in ruins from constant attacks.
If these accusations are ignored, regional tensions will likely freeze in place, opening the door to more proxy warfare, border clashes, and diplomatic fallout. On the other hand, quiet behind-the-scenes talks, perhaps led by the African Union, could create space for a joint investigation, secure the shared border, and restart negotiations over the main power struggle inside Sudan.
For now, the drones have gone quiet, but the shadows they cast remain. Sudan, Ethiopia and their neighbours stand at a dangerous crossroads.
