Kenya and Turkey have recently signed a military deal that signals a significant shift in defence cooperation between the transcontinental nation straddling Southeastern Europe and Southwestern Asia, and the East African powerhouse.
While the finer details of the May 2026 pact remain under wraps, Kenya’s Ministry of Defence has confirmed that Defence Cabinet Secretary Soipan Tuya and Turkey’s Minister of Defence, Yasar Guler, entered into a Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) aimed at institutionalising bilateral defence relations.
The framework envisions enhanced collaboration across military training, defence industry cooperation, technology exchange, and modernisation initiatives designed to strengthen Kenya’s long-term defence capabilities.
At its core, the deal is expected to see Turkey supply Kenya with drones to help modernise its forces as warfare evolves rapidly. Kenya, spanning 582,367 km² with an estimated 24,000 soldiers overseeing a population of 58 million, stands to benefit from partnering with Turkey’s formidable 355,000-strong military serving 87.9 million citizens across 783,562 km².
The pact was signed during the 5th International Defence and Aerospace Exhibition, SAHA Expo 2026, held in Istanbul—a fitting backdrop for a deal that could reshape Kenya’s defence landscape.
Turkey’s Push into the Horn of Africa
Turkey is keen to establish a commanding presence in the greater Horn of Africa, where it already has a strong foothold in Somalia, and Kenya represents a strategic partner given its status as a key non-NATO ally in the region. This move aligns with Ankara’s broader military expansion strategy, which has seen the country aggressively pursue a spot among the top 10 global military exporters.
Kenya is far from alone in this partnership. At least 25 nations currently maintain DCAs with Turkey, spanning West Africa, the Horn of Africa, and parts of Central and North Africa.
Some notable African nations trading with Turkey on defence hardware and software include Somalia, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Libya, among others.
The numbers tell a compelling story. Turkey’s premium defence publication, Defence Turkey, recently reported on February 6 that “the year 2025 marked a historic turning point for the Turkish Defence and Aerospace Industry. Export revenues increased by approximately 48.8% compared to the previous year, reaching USD 10.054 billion and surpassing the USD 10 billion threshold for the first time.”
According to a March 2025 release from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI, Turkey now ranks 11th globally as an arms exporter, accounting for 1.7% of global arms exports in 2020–24—up significantly from 0.8% in 2015–19. That represents a staggering 103% growth, one of the strongest rates among major exporters.
Turkey’s main recipients include the UAE (18%), Pakistan (10%), and Qatar (9.9%). In Africa, Tunisia, Nigeria, and Libya feature prominently among the top recipients. SIPRI also highlights Turkey as an emerging supplier, particularly active in sub-Saharan and West Africa, where it joins China, France, Russia, and the US in boosting influence.
Interestingly, Turkey is not just an exporter. The country ranks 22nd globally as an arms importer, accounting for 1.1% of global imports in 2020–24—down from 1.7% in 2015–19, marking a 33% decrease. Its main suppliers remain Spain (34%), Italy (24%), and Germany (19%).
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has not shied away from stating his ambition for Turkey to become one of the world’s top 10 defence exporters by 2028, with a target of $11 billion in exports.
During the SAHA Expo 2026 International Defence, Aviation and Space Industry Fair in Istanbul last month, he lavished praise on his country as one that had “proudly written its name among the countries whose star shines brightly on a global level in defence, aviation and space.”
He added that defence exports rose 28% between January and April of this year compared with the same period last year.
His country’s modernisation—especially in drone technology with drones like Bayraktar TB2, Akıncı, and Kızılelma in high demand—could be exactly what Kenya’s President William Ruto, among other African heads of state, wants.
Ruto’s modernisation drive of the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) has seen him move beyond Kenya’s traditional military hardware suppliers in Europe to countries like China, Israel, and Turkey for modern equipment.
During last year’s KDF Day, celebrated in Eldoret on October 14, he said: “We are modernising our equipment and technology. Bravery alone does not win battles; preparedness does.”
He opened up on fast-tracking acquisition of defence systems, improved mobility platforms, strengthened cyber and intelligence capabilities, and overall KDF upgrades to address evolving threats—just months before his Defence CS landed in Turkey to discuss procuring drones.
Kenya’s Defence White Paper, the foundational document that outlines the nation’s official National Defence Policy, says on Space Science and Defence Research and Development (R&D):
“The Ministry of Defence recognises Space Science, Research and Development as key components of technological advancement. The National Space Agency, which is domiciled in the Ministry, continues to partner with other National and International Institutions to explore opportunities available in the space arena. To this end, KDF will continue to support activities in Space Science, Research and Development linking it to industry in support of defence operational capability.”
The Somalia Blueprint
Ambassador (rtd) Ambeyi Ligabo, now at the Jaramogi Oginga Odinga University Council and founding Director of the Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA), says that the success of drone technology in Somalia in handling terror groups after years of struggle using conventional methods could be a trigger that modern warfare will be tech-driven.
“Drones make work easy as they are precise with targets and can man and patrol vast areas during surveillance and attacks. That goes against the conventional way of employing massive manpower on the ground or even in the air and in the process endangering their lives,” he told Open African Tribune.
“Somalia is growing in self-defence, and its forces are getting an edge over the cancer in the region—terrorism—in an unbelievable way through Turkey’s technology, and that could be triggering the shift of major African countries to go the Somali way.”
Turkey first entered Somalia in 2011 essentially to supply food and related aid, when the Horn of Africa state had been hit by severe famine.. The relationship then evolved into drones and other military hardware supplies that helped Mogadishu fight insurgent groups and attain some relative peace. With that relative peace, Mogadishu then signed landmark deals in oil, gas and maritime security in 2024.
Today, Turkish firms manage Mogadishu’s airport and port, modernising infrastructure and boosting revenue. It is, in fact, Mogadishu’s primary economic partner—having entered the nation on a humanitarian drive, stabilised it, invested, and now integrated with it.
In his September 2025 paper titled ‘The Evolution of Turkey’s Defence Industry: Drivers and its Nexus with Foreign Policy’, Dr Saban Kardas, a research professor in the Gulf Studies Program at Qatar University, traces Turkey’s rapid defence industry growth to seven interconnected drivers.
Persistent internal and external threats sustained the country’s military modernisation efforts, while a strong desire for strategic autonomy, coupled with past Western embargoes, encouraged self-reliance. Supportive state policies, funding mechanisms, and institutions promoted indigenous production, as domestic political priorities under the Justice and Development Party (JDP) accelerated localisation efforts.
Economic reforms and investments in research and development strengthened technological capabilities, while rising domestic and international demand expanded exports and industrial growth.
Finally, diversified international partnerships, he says, enabled technology transfers, joint production, and access to critical components while reducing dependence on traditional Western suppliers.
Dr Kardas marked out Turkey’s strategic “no strings attached” weapons export policy, which has helped consolidate Ankara’s own network of alliances.
“The country provides weapons systems not only to friendly countries such as Azerbaijan and Pakistan but as far afield as Africa, and, recently, Latin America. Through a combination of weapons exports, military training, aid, and defence diplomacy, Ankara complemented its soft power and economic assets in building new partnerships and penetrating new regions strategically.”
This transition away from NATO dependence has even facilitated new strategic relationships with major powers like Russia and China, further consolidated through joint military programmes.
However, Dr Kardas sounds a cautionary note: “Beyond Turkey’s niche position in drones, which accounts for a large portion of exports, it does not yet command market dominance in any other major platform globally.”
Beyond the Battlefield: Economic Opportunity or Missed Chance?
Kevin Osido, a governance and policy analyst based in Nairobi, told Open African Tribune that Kenya will not get direct economic benefits from the deal with Turkey if it focuses narrowly on military applications.
He advises that Kenya should think more broadly, drawing lessons from Somalia, where Turkey manages ports and trains its growing professional army, Ethiopia, which has had Turkey as a key mediator in its water conflict with Egypt and Morocco, and which is extending relations beyond war-related hardware into cultural and educational exchange, and even textiles.
“Look, we are genuinely not in war. We can adopt drone technology into surveillance of our borders to cut down on the influx of illegal goods, bolster health and agriculture, and even tourism by, say, tracking our wildlife. That way, we stand to gain much more from the drone deal than keeping the drones for war while Turkey pockets the profit for selling us what would hardly go to war,” he says.
He notes that Kenya’s position as a non-NATO ally in East Africa naturally aligns it with traditional partners like the US and the UK, who guided Kenya through its early military development. Kenya even hosts British barracks in Nanyukiat the British Army Training Unit Kenya (BATUK) ()—a landmark testament to deep-rooted ties with the UK and US. The trade with Turkey, he argues, remains passive if it stays on the line of war.
Similarly, Ambassador Ligabo questions whether Kenya, which has historically obtained military hardware from Europe, will pivot significantly.
“Is Ankara willing to service the weapons we get from them and freely train our men on how to operate them?” That, he says, will determine the military pact’s longevity.
In 2021, under its national security strategy agenda, Kenya entered a strategic partnership with the US aimed at bolstering its counter-terrorism capabilities, a move catalysed by the devastating Al-Shabaab attack on the Dusit2 Hotel in Nairobi in 2019.
The attack, which claimed 21 lives and sent shockwaves through the nation, exposed critical gaps in Kenya’s intelligence and response mechanisms. In response, the FBI stepped in with an intensive training programme designed to sharpen the skills of Kenyan investigators on the frontlines of the war against terror.
At least 42 carefully selected Kenyan investigators benefited from a rigorous 12-week training course at the prestigious FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia—the same institution that hones America’s finest federal agents. According to the US Embassy in Kenya, “The FBI administered the curriculum free of charge.”
Risks and Reservations
On the drone front, Ligabo strikes a cautious tone. Drones, he warns, “like a new toy in town can fall into the wrong hands and mess the programme.” He contrasts this with European partners who exercised a domineering role over their African partners, ensuring arms didn’t fall into the wrong hands. “Does Turkey have the capacity to do the same?” he asks.
Despite these reservations, Ligabo believes drones could significantly aid Kenya’s war on terrorism, particularly in the Boni Forest, where terrorists often hide, making it difficult for armed forces to navigate and neutralise threats.
Kenya’s Defence White Paper appreciates this threat, stating:
“Kenya’s strategic position within the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes region and its proximity to Somalia have exposed it to terrorism. Terrorist groups, including Al Shabaab, ISIL and their affiliates, continue to threaten national security. KDF, in conjunction with other National Security Agencies and International Security Organisations and Partners, will continue to take robust measures to counter these threats.” Whether Kenya’s acquisition of drones, in its continued robust security measures, will catalyse a broader transformation, morphing a military transaction into the kind of multifaceted trade, cultural exchange, and economic partnerships seen in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Morocco, remains a question still hovering in the skies, much like the very drones Ankara has offered.
