In June 2026, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger formally notified the United Nations (UN) of their decision to withdraw from the International Criminal Court (ICC), marking another significant step in the evolving political trajectory of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES).

If the withdrawal takes effect as provided under the Rome Statute, the three military-led governments will become the first bloc of countries to jointly leave the world’s permanent court for the prosecution of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression.

The decision extends a broader realignment that has reshaped the Sahel in recent years. Since forming the AES in 2023, the three countries have distanced themselves from several regional and international institutions, withdrawn from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), reconfigured their security partnerships, and increasingly framed their foreign policy around national sovereignty and resistance to external influence.

Their planned exit from the ICC therefore represents more than a legal procedure. Experts say it reflects a wider political and diplomatic shift that continues to redefine the region’s engagement with international governance.

But the significance of the decision extends beyond the three Sahel states. According to observers, it has reignited global debates about who defines international justice, whether powerful and weaker states are held to the same standards, and how sovereignty should be balanced against accountability for the world’s gravest crimes. As geopolitical alignments continue to shift, the AES withdrawal has become a test of the future legitimacy of international criminal justice itself.

Critics, however, argue that leaving the ICC could weaken avenues for accountability, particularly in countries confronting armed conflict, political instability and allegations of serious human rights abuses.

Understanding the Legal Process of ICC Withdrawal

The decision by Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger to leave the ICC follows a legal process set out in Article 127 of the Rome Statute, the treaty that established the Court in 1998. According to the Rome Statute, any State Party may withdraw by submitting a written notification to the Secretary-General of the UN, who serves as the treaty’s depositary. The withdrawal, however, does not take immediate effect. Instead, it becomes effective one year after the notification is received.

The BBC reported that the AES members formally notified the UN of their intention to withdraw in June 2026, setting in motion the one-year withdrawal period required under the Rome Statute. During this period, the countries remain bound by their obligations as States Parties and are expected to continue cooperating with the Court where necessary.

However, legal experts note that leaving the ICC does not automatically shield a country or its nationals from the Court’s jurisdiction. According to the Rome Statute, withdrawal does not affect any cooperation obligations that arose before the withdrawal takes effect, nor does it prevent the Court from continuing investigations or prosecutions relating to crimes allegedly committed while the country was still a State Party.

According to a criminal litigation lawyer, Adedeji Afolabi, Article 127 was deliberately drafted to ensure that “states cannot evade accountability simply by withdrawing from the Rome Statute after allegations of international crimes have emerged.”

He explained that the one-year notice period was intended to preserve ongoing investigations and prevent states from frustrating accountability by withdrawing after alleged international crimes had been committed.

Why the AES Chose to Leave the ICC

Since forming the AES in 2023, the three military-led governments have steadily distanced themselves from several regional and international bodies, arguing that existing frameworks no longer reflect their security priorities or national interests.

According to a report by the BBC, the three governments justified their withdrawal by accusing the ICC of serving as “an instrument of neo-colonialist repression” and argued that the Court had failed to respect the sovereignty of African states. They also maintained that international justice has often been applied selectively, with African countries facing disproportionate scrutiny while alleged violations in other parts of the world receive comparatively limited attention.

An analysis by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS Africa) reported that these developments show the massive effort by the three governments to assert greater political autonomy and reduce what they perceive as external influence over domestic affairs.

This argument has long resonated within parts of Africa. Since the ICC began operations in 2002, several African leaders have criticised the Court for what they describe as selective justice, pointing out that many of its early investigations focused on African conflicts.

Although several of those cases were referred to the Court by African governments themselves or authorised by the UN Security Council, critics maintain that the pattern has fuelled perceptions of unequal treatment within the international justice system.

However, the decision has also attracted criticism from human rights organisations and international justice advocates. TRIAL International described the coordinated withdrawal as “a step back for victims and justice,” warning that it could further weaken accountability for victims of war crimes and crimes against humanity in a region that continues to experience armed conflict and humanitarian crises. The organisation stated that while governments may leave the ICC, victims’ need for justice does not disappear.

Justice Info, in its analysis of the withdrawals, similarly notes that the move should be viewed within a wider political context rather than as an isolated legal decision. According to the publication, the coordinated nature of the withdrawals reflects the AES’s long-term ambition to reshape its engagement with international institutions and project a common diplomatic position on issues of governance, security and sovereignty.

Speaking with Open African Tribune, historian and international relations analyst Oluwatobi Ajadi explained that the AES withdrawal is both a symbolic assertion of sovereignty and also part of a larger restructuring of international relations in the Sahel, adding that, “growing geopolitical competition has influenced the zone’s foreign policy choices.”

Sovereignty versus Accountability: A Longstanding Debate

According to a report by ISS Africa, the AES consider their withdrawal as part of a strategic agenda to reclaim political autonomy and resist external interference in domestic affairs. The report noted that the coordinated exit forms part of the bloc’s wider diplomatic realignment.

Several reports also showed that the argument is not entirely new. For more than a decade, sections of the African Union have questioned whether the ICC has disproportionately focused on Africa. In 2017, the African Union adopted a non-binding strategy encouraging member states to consider a collective approach to engagement with the Court, following concerns about selective prosecutions and the influence of global power politics on international justice.

Supporters of the Court, however, reject the suggestion that it unfairly targets Africa. According to the ICC, several of its earliest investigations, including those in Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali and the Central African Republic, were initiated at the request of the governments concerned, while others were referred by the UN Security Council. The Court has consistently maintained that it acts within the limits of the Rome Statute and that its mandate is guided by evidence and jurisdiction rather than geography.

Human rights organisations have also cautioned against viewing sovereignty and accountability as mutually exclusive. TRIAL International believes the withdrawal of the AES states risks limiting avenues for justice for victims of atrocities committed during armed conflicts across the Sahel. The organisation stressed that, in situations where national judicial systems are unable or unwilling to prosecute international crimes, independent accountability mechanisms remain an essential safeguard against impunity.

Public policy analyst Taiwo Ismael believes the debate should not be reduced to a simple choice between sovereignty and international justice.

“The ICC is far from perfect, especially given concerns about perceived double standards and the inability or unwillingness to hold powerful states to the same standards as weaker countries,” he told Open African Tribune. “These concerns have fuelled legitimate questions about selective justice.”

He, however, noted that despite those criticisms, the Court still provides an important layer of accountability. “For many African countries, the ICC sends a message that there are limits to political power and that serious international crimes should not escape scrutiny simply because domestic institutions fail.”

According to Ismael, the challenge is not necessarily choosing between sovereignty and accountability, but ensuring both coexist through reforms that make international justice more representative and impartial.

Legal scholars similarly note that sovereignty has evolved in international law. Criminal litigation lawyer, Afolabi, explained that while states retain primary responsibility for maintaining law and order within their territories, “that authority increasingly exists alongside international obligations to prevent and prosecute genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.” He stressed that the establishment of the ICC itself was rooted in the principle that the most serious crimes are of concern to the international community as a whole.

Niger as a Lens: Sovereignty, Sanctions and a Changing Global Order

While the withdrawal from the ICC is a collective decision by the AES, Niger provides the clearest illustration of the wider political philosophy driving the bloc’s engagement with international institutions. The country’s recent foreign and domestic policy decisions reflect a coordinated strategy to redefine its place within an evolving international order, where questions of sovereignty, external influence and strategic partnerships have become increasingly contested.

The shift began after the July 2023 military takeover that removed President Mohamed Bazoum from office. The coup triggered widespread condemnation from the international community and prompted ECOWAS to impose sanctions while threatening military intervention to restore constitutional order. Western governments, including France and the United States, also suspended aspects of their security cooperation and development assistance.

Rather than reversing course, Niger’s military authorities adopted a different strategy. Alongside Burkina Faso and Mali, the country strengthened the Alliance of Sahel States, withdrew from ECOWAS and pursued new security and diplomatic partnerships outside its traditional allies.

Supporters of the AES position argue that the current international system often reflects unequal power dynamics. They contend that African governments have, at times, faced stronger diplomatic pressure and international scrutiny than more powerful states accused of comparable violations of international law.

Critics, however, caution that dissatisfaction with global governance should not undermine protections for victims of atrocity crimes. TRIAL International has argued that although debates over the legitimacy of international institutions are both valid and necessary, reducing access to international accountability mechanisms could disproportionately affect civilians living in conflict-affected regions where domestic judicial systems face significant constraints.

Beyond the legal implications, Niger’s trajectory indicates a wider transformation taking place across parts of Africa. International relations analyst Ajadi explained that growing geopolitical competition, the emergence of new security partnerships and increasing calls for a multipolar international order have encouraged some governments to reassess long-standing relationships with global institutions.

“Rather than viewing Niger’s withdrawal from the ICC in isolation,” Ajadi said, “it is better to see it as one chapter in a bigger reconfiguration of political authority and international engagement across the Sahel.”

He concluded that whether the strategy ultimately delivers greater autonomy, stronger institutions and improved accountability remains an open question, but it has undoubtedly reshaped debates about geopolitics and international justice both within Africa and beyond.

What Withdrawal Means for Ongoing Cases and Future Accountability

According to the Rome Statute, a state’s withdrawal does not affect the Court’s jurisdiction over crimes allegedly committed before the withdrawal becomes effective. Nor does it invalidate investigations or judicial proceedings already underway. This means that ongoing cases involving the AES states, particularly Mali, may continue despite the country’s decision to leave the Court.

Justice Info reported that Mali remains the only AES member with an active history of ICC investigations. The Court opened investigations in 2013 after the Malian government referred the situation in its northern territories, where armed groups were accused of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity during the conflict. Several prosecutions have since followed, including the landmark conviction of Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi for the destruction of cultural and religious sites in Timbuktu, as well as proceedings involving other alleged perpetrators.

The implications are different for Burkina Faso and Niger. Although neither country currently has an active ICC case comparable to Mali’s, legal experts note that the Court could still exercise jurisdiction over crimes allegedly committed before their withdrawals take effect, provided the legal requirements under the Rome Statute are met.

The withdrawals have also renewed discussions about what accountability mechanisms remain available once the one-year notice period expires. According to TRIAL International, domestic courts remain the primary avenue for prosecuting serious international crimes.

However, the organisation cautioned that in countries experiencing political instability, armed conflict or weakened judicial institutions, national systems may face significant challenges in conducting credible investigations and prosecutions.

Beyond domestic courts, regional and international mechanisms may continue to play a role. Human rights violations can still be examined through the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, while certain crimes may be prosecuted under the principle of universal jurisdiction, which allows some national courts to try individuals accused of grave international crimes regardless of where the offences were committed. In exceptional circumstances, the UN Security Council may also refer situations involving non-State Parties to the ICC, as it previously did with Darfur in Sudan and Libya.

The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) has consistently reported that sustainable accountability depends not only on international courts but also on strengthening domestic justice systems capable of investigating and prosecuting serious crimes in accordance with international standards. Many legal scholars share this view, noting that international mechanisms are intended to complement and not replace national judicial institutions.

Speaking with Open African Tribune, public interest lawyer, Maxwell Adigun, said leaving the ICC does not automatically resolve the broader challenges of accountability.

“The real question is whether domestic institutions have the independence, resources and political will to investigate and prosecute atrocity crimes,” he said. “If those institutions remain weak, victims may still struggle to obtain justice regardless of whether a country remains within the ICC system.”

Africa, the ICC and the Future of International Justice

Africa’s relationship with the ICC has never been one of outright rejection. According to the ICC, African states played a central role in negotiating and adopting the Rome Statute, and the continent remains the largest regional bloc within the Court’s membership. Many of the Court’s investigations in Africa were initiated at the request of the countries concerned.

The AES decision also differs from previous withdrawals. According to PBS News, Burundi became the first country to complete its withdrawal from the ICC in 2017, while the Philippines left the Court in 2019 following disagreements over investigations into former President Rodrigo Duterte’s anti-drug campaign. By contrast, the withdrawals by Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger represent the first coordinated exit by members of a regional political alliance, signalling a collective diplomatic position rather than isolated national decisions.

Similarly, South Africa announced its intention to withdraw from the ICC in 2016 after disputes surrounding its decision not to arrest then-Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir during an African Union summit. However, domestic legal challenges led the government to revoke its notice before later reopening political discussions on the issue. Also, The Gambia announced plans to leave the Court in 2016, accusing it of unfairly targeting African countries, but reversed the decision after a change of government in early 2017.

These differing experiences, experts say, illustrate that withdrawal from the ICC is often shaped as much by domestic politics and foreign policy considerations as by legal disagreements with the Court itself. They also demonstrate that debates over membership continue to evolve, even among countries that ultimately decide to remain within the Rome Statute system.

The African Union’s Search for an African Model of Justice

For more than a decade, the African Union (AU) has argued that while accountability is essential, it should increasingly be pursued through stronger African-led mechanisms that better reflect the continent’s legal traditions and political realities.

The AU’s criticism of the ICC has centred on what many African leaders describe as the Court’s disproportionate focus on Africa and concerns over the prosecution of sitting heads of state. Successive AU summits have called for reforms to the international justice system while encouraging greater investment in regional institutions capable of prosecuting atrocity crimes.

One of the most ambitious proposals is the Malabo Protocol, adopted by the African Union in 2014. The protocol seeks to expand the jurisdiction of the proposed African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights to include international crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, terrorism, piracy, corruption and unconstitutional changes of government. Supporters argue that such a court would provide an African-led framework for accountability while reducing dependence on external judicial institutions.

However, the proposal has faced significant challenges. The Malabo Protocol has yet to enter into force because it has not received the required number of ratifications by AU member states. Legal scholars have also debated provisions granting immunity to serving heads of state and senior government officials, arguing that they could undermine accountability for the gravest international crimes.

Nevertheless, observers argue that the proposal indicates an aspiration within parts of the continent to develop regional institutions capable of complementing, rather than necessarily replacing, global mechanisms such as the ICC.

Beyond the ICC, a Test for International Justice

Several experts interviewed and cited for this report argue that the decision by Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger to withdraw from the ICC represents the latest expression of a growing political movement within the Sahel, where military-led governments are redefining their relationships with regional organisations, Western partners and international institutions in pursuit of what they describe as greater sovereignty and strategic autonomy.

At the same time, civil society organisations say sovereignty cannot, on its own, guarantee justice. As TRIAL International has noted, victims of war crimes, crimes against humanity and other grave violations continue to require effective avenues for accountability, regardless of the political choices made by governments. Whether through national courts, regional mechanisms or international institutions, the pursuit of justice remains a fundamental obligation under international law.

The Institute for Security Studies (ISS Africa) similarly observes that the AES withdrawals should be understood within the wider transformation taking place across the Sahel, where questions of governance, security and foreign policy are increasingly intertwined. The institute holds that the challenge for both African governments and international institutions is to ensure that legitimate demands for sovereignty do not come at the expense of accountability, just as the pursuit of international justice must not ignore legitimate concerns about fairness, representation and equal application of the law.

Whether the AES departure ultimately marks the beginning of a larger departure from the ICC or remains an exceptional political moment will depend on how both African governments and international institutions respond in the years ahead. What is already clear, however, is that the debate has moved beyond the courtroom. It is now equally about sovereignty, legitimacy, institutional reform and the future architecture of international justice in an increasingly multipolar world.