The Democratic Republic of Congo has taken a strong stand on its most important exports. On June 29, 2026, the government issued an order banning exports of copper and cobalt concentrates, as part of a long-term effort to encourage more mineral processing within the country rather than abroad.

The ban was effective immediately and was publicly confirmed in early August. A document reviewed by Reuters showed that Mines Minister Louis Kabamba Watum, Foreign Trade Minister Julien Paluku Kahongya, and Economy Minister Daniel Mukoko Samba signed it.

The order clearly says that exporting copper and cobalt concentrates is now prohibited, although one-year waivers can still be granted in strategic cases.

This move puts Kinshasa at the heart of a global debate about who benefits from the minerals that fuel electric vehicles, smartphones, and renewable energy systems.

It also raises difficult questions that resource-rich countries have wrestled with for decades: does limiting raw exports actually help build their industries, or does it just cut off potential revenue without the necessary infrastructure to replace it?

What is Getting Banned

The ban applies to concentrates, partially processed ore that has been crushed and treated to increase mineral content but still needs further smelting or refining before it can be sold as a metal.

Mining companies operating in the DRC are now forbidden from shipping copper or cobalt concentrate out of the country. Along with this export ban, the government has introduced a new tax system on key mining by-products, giving companies three months to adjust.

These taxes are said to be based on a valuation coefficient of 55 per cent of the minerals’ assessed value, with royalties added on top of those already charged on the main mineral being mined.

The government says the goal is to encourage mining companies to focus on producing and exporting higher-value mineral products rather than semi-processed ore.

Kinshasa wants firms to invest in building or expanding smelting and refining facilities within the country, so more profits stay locally instead of going to overseas processors, especially in China.

This is not an absolute or permanent ban. The DRC may still grant temporary waivers of up to a year in cases deemed strategically important, though the text does not specify the conditions for these exemptions.

This approach reflects previous iterations of the same policy: the DRC imposed similar restrictions in 2013, 2019, and 2023, each time granting waivers when it became evident that domestic smelting capacity couldn’t handle all the exports.

The 2026 order officially repeals the 2023 measure and its exemptions, replacing them with a broader framework that covers mineral exports and by-product taxes.

Why Copper and Cobalt are Important

Few resources influence the modern global economy as much as these two minerals. Cobalt plays a crucial role in the cathodes of lithium-ion batteries found in electric vehicles (EVs), laptops, and smartphones, while copper is vital to nearly all electrified systems, from power grids and wind turbines to the wiring inside EVs.

As the push for decarbonisation gains momentum worldwide, demand for both metals continues to rise, along with increased geopolitical focus on who controls their supply.

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) sits at the very heart of this supply chain. It’s by far the world’s largest producer of cobalt and ranks among the top copper suppliers; some estimates even place it second globally.

This dominance gives the country considerable influence over battery and electronics manufacturers globally, many of which don’t have viable alternative sources of cobalt at scale.

Now, Kinshasa is trying to turn this leverage into industrial policy, shifting from merely exporting raw materials year after year.

The amount of production involved is quite significant. In just the first quarter of 2026, the DRC exported about 697,000 tonnes of refined copper cathodes, compared to roughly 54,000 tonnes of copper concentrates that contained just under 19,000 tonnes of copper metal.

During the same period, the country also shipped nearly 52,000 tonnes of cobalt hydroxides with about 17,000 tonnes of cobalt metal. These numbers show that most of the Congolese copper is already leaving the country in a highly processed state, which will affect the impact of this new ban.

Ban Might Have Little Impact

One of the most notable things about the new policy is that, according to analysts, it might not shake up the industry as much as the headlines imply. Christian-Geraud Neema, a mining analyst with the non-profit China-Global South Project, has pointed out that the ban probably won’t significantly impact most operators, since most of the copper and cobalt from the DRC is already refined within the country before it even reaches an export terminal.

Many of the major mining companies in the country have long since set up the smelting and refining facilities now being mandated more broadly by the government.

The main exception is a small number of operations that still qualify for exemptions, allowing them to export concentrate instead of finished metal.

Neema pointed to the Kamoa-Kakula project, owned by Ivanhoe Mines, China’s Zijin Mining, and the Congolese government, as potentially the most vulnerable, since it’s been exporting some concentrate under previous waivers.

When the ban was first announced, neither Ivanhoe nor Zijin made public comments, and the Congolese chamber of mines chose not to respond.

Aside from Kamoa-Kakula, the major players in Congo’s copper and cobalt mining include a mix of Chinese and Western multinationals: CMOC, which is the world’s largest cobalt producer; Glencore; Huayou Cobalt; Zijin Mining; Ivanhoe Mines; and the Eurasian Resources Group.

This list really shows how deeply Chinese investment runs in Congo’s mining industry. Chinese companies control some of the country’s largest cobalt and copper assets and have financed much of the domestic smelting infrastructure.

This capacity is now critical because it determines which companies are protected from the ban and which are still exposed. China’s commercial interest in this is significant: ensuring the smooth operation of Chinese-linked ventures depends on Congo’s processing capacity keeping up with China’s own restrictions.

The Markets Reaction

Global commodity markets didn’t wait for clarification before reacting. Once news of the ban broke, the benchmark three-month copper price on the London Metal Exchange jumped by as much as 1.8 per cent, reaching its highest point since late January, when the metal briefly hit an all-time peak.

This reaction shows how sensitive global markets remain to policy signals from Kinshasa, even when the immediate impact on physical supply may be limited in the short term.

Traders seem to be factoring in the risk that further restrictions or unpredictable enforcement could reduce the amount of concentrate still reaching international refineries.

The Potential and The Obstacles

The potential benefit for the DRC is significant. Every tonne of concentrate processed locally instead of exported means value stays in the country, revenue from smelting, refining, additional jobs, and taxes that would otherwise go to overseas processing centres.

Developing this capacity could create new jobs in mining towns, strengthen the country’s industries, and boost government income from a sector often criticised for not benefiting ordinary Congolese citizens enough.

Turning this potential into reality, however, depends on infrastructure the DRC still lacks. The biggest hurdle is electricity. The country faces a major power shortage, raising doubts about whether its current infrastructure can support expanded mining, smelting, and refining activities.

Smelting is extremely energy-intensive, and without a reliable, sufficiently large power supply, efforts to increase domestic processing might stall before they even get going.

Industry experts based in the DRC have pointed to energy as the biggest challenge, determining whether the export restrictions can truly translate into lasting economic gains or just leave unprocessed ore sitting at the mine gate.

In addition to electricity, expanding local processing would require investment in transportation, more skilled workers, and clear rules to give investors the confidence to commit for the long term.

None of this can be built overnight. Smelters and refineries generally take years to plan, finance, and construct. So, even if the economic case is strong, any increase in processing capacity driven by this ban is unlikely to happen quickly.

Will it Unsettle Investors?

This is where the main risk of the DRC’s strategy comes into play. Imposing export bans without enough downstream capacity can backfire in a couple of ways.

First, there’s the danger of losing legitimate export revenue if waivers aren’t granted quickly enough to close the gap between processing capacity and overall mineral output. The government tries to manage this by offering discretionary one-year exemptions.

Second, and more seriously, unpredictable application of these waivers can unsettle investors, who usually prioritise regulatory consistency when investing hundreds of millions of dollars in mining projects.

This isn’t just theory. The pattern of repeated bans and exemptions since 2013 shows a government that occasionally uses trade restrictions as a tool, only to loosen them once processing shortfalls become clear.

Investors looking at new smelter or refinery projects will be watching closely to see whether this cycle continues or if it’s just another washout in which waivers dilute the impact within months.

There’s also a more subtle factor at play: even if the implementation isn’t perfect, the policy might actually strengthen the DRC’s bargaining position with international buyers. By signalling that export restrictions on a mineral the world badly needs are possible, the government sends a message that supply isn’t guaranteed.

This could push companies eager to secure long-term access to Congolese cobalt and copper to accelerate investments in local refining, just to avoid future restrictions, rather than wait to see how strictly the ban is enforced.

Common Trend in Parts of Africa

The DRC isn’t acting alone. Around the region, other mineral-rich countries are also trying to keep more of the value from their resources rather than just exporting them in raw form.

Zambia, for example, has become a key destination for copper investment as global demand grows, partly fuelled by the shift towards green energy.

Still, many Zambians question how much of that wealth actually benefits local communities instead of international investors and lenders. Zimbabwe has also imposed restrictions on raw mineral exports to encourage more local processing.

This reflects a broader trend across the continent: a move away from simply exporting raw ore and a push, sometimes supported by trade restrictions or higher taxes, to keep more processing and profit within Africa.

Whether this push leads to real industrial growth or merely creates more supply chain hurdles without building lasting local capacity remains unclear, not only in the DRC but across the region.

Will it Affect Investor Confidence?

For Kinshasa, the situation is quite complex. Copper and cobalt exports are vital to the government’s revenue, foreign exchange earnings, and jobs in the formal sector.

Any policy that threatens to disrupt this flow must be carefully considered against the potential long-term benefits of developing a larger domestic processing industry. If the ban encourages more companies to invest in building smelters and refineries within the country, it could lead to increased tax revenue, royalties, and employment in the coming years.

However, if the restrictions prove too costly or uncertain for investors, some companies might quietly hold back on expansion or shift their investments elsewhere, which could undermine the very industrial goals the policy aims to achieve.

Adding to this is the new tax on mining by-products. By imposing taxes on valuable minerals recovered during refining, based on a significant portion of their value and combined with existing royalties, the government is trying to generate revenue from materials that have often been overlooked in the current tax system.

This indicates that Kinshasa isn’t just trying to push processing onshore but also seeks to extract more value from the processing that already occurs, whether through fully domestic operations or joint ventures with international refiners.

Whether the DRC’s newest export ban signals a real step towards controlling its mineral resources or simply continues a pattern of restrictions and exemptions that has lasted for twenty years will depend on much more than just the wording of one government order.

To truly expand local processing, factors such as electricity, transportation, technical skills, and investor confidence need to align with the policy.

What’s clear is that the DRC has real influence. Its control over cobalt supply and a large share of global copper production give Kinshasa bargaining power few resource-rich countries can match. The market’s immediate reaction, a surge in copper prices right after the announcement, shows that global buyers are taking Congolese policies seriously.

The next challenge is turning that influence into a sustainable, locally driven industry rather than granting more waivers once the country’s processing limits become apparent.

For a nation whose mineral wealth has often been mined for export rather than value-added processing, shifting from just exporting raw materials to developing genuine processing capacity would be a fundamental change in its economic landscape.