On August 16, three thousand young Somalis marched across a parade ground in Xananbuure, Galgaduud, and officially joined the Somali National Army.

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud watched them pass by, flanked by the leaders of Galmudug and his own defence minister. Among the dignitaries were Saudi military officers, who financed and partly oversaw the year-long training program. By the end of the ceremony, Somalia had formed its largest single group of trained soldiers since the state collapsed in 1991.

While this milestone makes headlines, it also raises tougher questions. Who actually trained these recruits, and to what standards? Where will they be deployed once the parade photos fade from view? And can a force assembled so quickly do what decades of foreign intervention have failed to achieve, dismantle Al-Shabaab and control Somali territory without external support?

One Year Training for the Young Soldiers

The recruits who graduated in Xananbuure came from Mogadishu and Somalia’s federal member states and spent nearly a year learning the essentials of soldiering: weapons handling, small-unit tactics, military law, and discipline.

None of the instructors was purely Somali in origin; instructors from Ukraine, Romania, and Sudan managed much of the curriculum, with some regional reports also mentioning trainers from South Africa and Colombia. Saudi Arabia funded the entire program and sent officials to Galgaduud multiple times throughout the year to monitor progress.

The funding and mandate trace back to a defence agreement that Mogadishu signed with Riyadh in February, in which Saudi Arabia pledged to train about 5,000 Somali soldiers. The recent graduation class represents most of that commitment in one intake; this is why officials are calling it a historic milestone.

Somalia has trained soldiers before, in smaller groups and under different flags, but nothing on this scale has happened since the central government collapsed over three decades ago.

President Mohamud used the occasion to make a bigger statement than just about training soldiers. He told the gathered crowd that the graduation demonstrated Somalia’s statehood was being rebuilt from the ground up and that the country no longer needed foreign forces to secure its safety.

On the same day, he also told African Union peacekeepers directly that it was time for them to go home, suggesting they be sent off “with a bunch of flowers,” as he put it.

That’s quite a statement, especially considering your army is still in the process of integrating thousands of new soldiers. The real challenge here isn’t how the parade appears, but whether the message behind it really holds up.

Where Will the New Soldiers be Deployed?

Neither the government nor the Saudi programme has released a detailed plan for deploying the 3,000 graduates, and that oversight is significant.

Somalia’s National Army today serves multiple roles: fighting Al-Shabaab on active fronts, managing garrison units guarding towns handed over by departing African Union forces, and increasingly acting as a tool of federal authority in disputes with regional administrations.

Recent incidents suggest these new soldiers may be needed for all three roles at once, which itself raises concerns. Just a day after the Xananbuure ceremony, deadly clashes erupted in Baidoa between federal troops and fighters loyal to Abdiaziz Laftagaren, the former president of Southwest state.

Initial reports indicate more than ten people were killed and around twenty wounded, a figure that cannot yet be independently verified. The army claimed to have repelled an assault by “Khawarij”, the term Somali officials often use for Al-Shabaab, and asserted control of the city.

Laftagaren’s spokesperson contested that, saying his forces had pushed into Baidoa’s centre. With phone networks down during the fighting, neither side’s account could be confirmed.

The timing couldn’t have been worse for the government’s messaging. President Mohamud had just told a stadium full of soldiers and journalists that Somalia no longer needed foreign protection.

Yet, within a day, his own army was struggling to assert control over a regional capital against a domestic, clan-based rival, a far smaller and less capable opponent than Al-Shabaab. Critics quickly pointed out the stark difference between the official rhetoric and the reality on the ground.

Al-Shabaab Threat Still a Major Concern

It’s important to be frank about the size of the threat Somalia claims it can face on its own. Al-Shabaab remains Al-Qaeda’s most powerful and resilient affiliate worldwide.

It collects taxes from businesses and transportation routes across much of south-central Somalia, operates a shadow court system preferred by many locals over the official judiciary because it’s faster and less corrupt, and can still carry out attacks in Mogadishu despite years of operations backed by the African Union, the US, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia.

There’s no indication that the group’s capabilities have significantly weakened. Their financial networks, based on extortion and control of strategic roads, remain mostly intact. Their ability to carry out complex assaults on well-defended government and military positions has proven durable through various foreign military operations since the African Union’s first deployment in 2007.

Having a newly trained infantry unit, regardless of its size, doesn’t, by itself, change this reality. What would matter is whether these soldiers are supported by effective logistics, real-time intelligence, air support, and a command structure capable of coordinating across regions, none of which a training certificate alone provides.

UN Layoff Notices

The situation surrounding this expansion raises the stakes rather than lowering them. Somalia’s international security framework is shrinking quickly and not gradually. The African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission (AUSSOM), which took over from the previous ATMIS mission at the start of 2025, has a mandate that runs out on December 31, 2026.

It relies heavily on the UN Support Office in Somalia for essentials like fuel, transport, medical care, and logistics that keep peacekeepers operational every day. Washington has told the African Union it won’t support extending that UN logistical support beyond the current mandate, though it hasn’t explicitly blocked renewal if alternative funding can be arranged.

This isn’t just a hypothetical problem anymore. The United Nations has already begun sending layoff notices to civilian staff supporting the mission and has started selling off mission property, vehicles, IT equipment, construction tools, medical units, and aircraft hardware, through local sales.

So far, ten jobs have been cut, with officials familiar with the process warning that more layoffs could happen within days. The UN support office operated on a $502 million budget last year, far exceeding the AU mission’s $190 million for troop reimbursements and welfare.

Losing that support isn’t just an inconvenience for peacekeepers; it threatens to dismantle the logistics backbone that has supported Somalia’s international security efforts for nearly twenty years.

Meanwhile, Somalia’s partners see this moment quite differently from Mogadishu. Uganda’s defence minister has said Ugandan troops, 4,500 under the AU mission plus 2,000 more under a separate bilateral agreement, will stay regardless of what happens to the AU framework.

Reports indicate Kenya, Ethiopia, and Egypt also plan to keep their forces in Somalia through 2027. Turkey has developed one of the most extensive bilateral military ties in the country’s recent history, training thousands of soldiers at Camp TURKSOM since 2017, including elite Gorgor commandos, and maintaining a troop presence that its parliament has authorised to grow to 2,500.

The United States continues to support Somalia with intelligence, training, and air support from outside any AU structure.

All in all, this doesn’t seem like Somalia is transitioning from international dependence to self-sufficiency. It’s more like a tangled, overlapping web of foreign involvement – AU, UN, Turkish, American, Egyptian, Emirati, and now Saudi – being reshuffled rather than replaced.

Will Somalia Struggle to Pay Salaries for the New Soldiers?

Training thousands of new soldiers might seem straightforward, especially when a foreign government covers the costs. But when it comes to keeping them fed, paid, armed, and medically cared for afterwards, the challenge falls on Somalia itself, a burden the nation has wrestled with for years.

Past expansion efforts have been marred by reports of unpaid wages, desertions, and low morale, undercutting units that, on paper, appeared to be fully capable. Corruption within payroll and procurement processes has periodically siphoned off funds and equipment meant for frontline troops.

A bigger army only amplifies these problems. Three thousand new soldiers mean three thousand more salaries, uniforms, rifles, ammunition, and eventually, medical and pension costs, expenses that strain a government whose revenue remains limited and heavily reliant on international aid.

There’s also the tougher issue of unity. Somalia’s federal army has long struggled to bring together recruits from various clans, regions, and different training backgrounds, some trained by Turkey, others by the United States, and now by a mix of Saudi, Ukrainian, Romanian, and Sudanese partners, into a cohesive force that responds to a single national command instead of regional or clan loyalties.

The recent clashes in Baidoa serve as a stark reminder of how quickly these allegiances can resurface. It wasn’t a fight against Al-Shabaab but a domestic power struggle involving the federal government and a former regional president’s armed followers.

That doesn’t mean integration is out of reach. Somalia’s federal system was designed, at least on paper, to eventually unite regional forces under a single national framework. Over the past decade, there has been some progress integrating units from Jubaland, Southwest, and other states into the federal command structure.

But the process has been slow and uneven, shaped by political negotiations as much as by military considerations. Introducing a new, foreign-trained group into this already complex mix adds another layer of complications rather than simplifying it, at least in the short term.

Somalia’s Security Problems

Somalia’s security issues go beyond just Al-Shabaab. Organised crime, arms trafficking, and unresolved border insecurity continue to add complexity, along with a growingly tense political climate between the federal government and regions.

When Mohamud visited Galmudug to oversee the graduation, it wasn’t just about security; it also showed his confrontation with neighbouring Puntland. Puntland has put its forces on alert and accused Mogadishu of stirring instability in Galkayo, a city claimed by both sides.

The increased presence of a federal military trained and supplied through Riyadh’s program is boosting Mogadishu’s position in this internal rivalry, as well as strengthening the fight against Al-Shabaab, a dual purpose that nearby regional powers are sure to notice.

An Achievement That Should Not Be Dismissed

The Xananbuure graduation stands as a true milestone by any historical standard. Training and graduating 3,000 soldiers in a single class, supported by consistent foreign funding and instruction, is something Somalia hasn’t achieved since 1991, which reflects a genuine sign of the country’s slowly rebuilding institutional capacity.

Dismissing this accomplishment outright would be unfair. However, scale does not equate to readiness, and readiness does not guarantee sustainability.

The new soldiers step into an army already struggling with issues like pay, cohesion, and command, problems that remain unresolved, just as the international support structure being relied on is being dismantled faster than any domestic alternative can be developed.

The clashes in Baidoa that broke out a day after the ceremony provided an immediate and uncomfortable test of the government’s confidence, one that the army did not pass without difficulties.

Whether this graduation signals a genuine turning point in Somalia’s long-standing security crises or merely results in a larger force burdened with the same structural weaknesses that have hampered previous expansions remains uncertain.

It won’t be decided by a parade; it depends on whether Mogadishu can reliably pay these soldiers, deploy them effectively, and defend territory against Al-Shabaab, independent of foreign support – a support system that is now being dismantled just as the country claims it no longer needs it.